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"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit*, c. 6.

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SOCIALISTS AND SOCIALISM.

It is a commonplace that Socialism has already become a powerful world-wide movement and is destined to acquire still greater momentum. The strength which it already possesses in the German Empire is considered to be one of the most significant factors in the political world today, and many competent persons are of the opinion that if German Socialism could but dissociate itself from the anti-religious elements of its constitution it would at once obtain an immense accession of Catholic workingmen. If you wish to gauge its power in England, you have but to observe the present situation in which a responsible government has endeavored to meet the recent national, industrial and commercial crises by the introduction of legislative measures, which the most prominent English statesman has designated as pure, unadulterated Socialism. In America the strength of the Socialist party is comparatively slight, but its numbers are by no means trivial; and the extent to which Socialist views prevail is not to be measured by the figures which represent the strict party affiliation. There are many organizations which though not constituents of the Socialist party itself are yet active promoters of Socialist economic and political ideas. Besides, outside of all Socialist and semi-Socialist associations, the feeling and conviction is in the atmosphere of the wage-earning world that the toilers are not getting their just share of the wealth which, without them,

would not exist—and this atmosphere is the very one to favor the growth of Socialism. For, to great numbers of those who suffer under the present distribution of the good things of life, Socialism presents itself as the messiah announcing a new kingdom of justice wherein the worker shall receive the full product of his labor, and where if any man shall not work neither shall he eat. What is the source whence Socialism draws its vitality and vigor? To this question a unanimous answer is returned by clouds of witnesses, many of whom would agree upon scarcely any other matter regarding the subject. Here Leo XIII and Archbishop Kettler are in accord with Mr. Bax and Mr. Hyndman. "It is the giant task of our age," declared Kettler, "to fill up again the abyss that divides the rich from the poor and woe to us if it is not filled up." Said Leo XIII: "All agree and there can be no question whatever that some remedy must be found and found quickly for the misery and wretchedness pressing so heavily and unjustly at this moment on the vast majority of the working classes." The twenty years that have elapsed since these words were written, which epitomize ten thousand pages of burning invective thrown out continually by the Socialist press, have not witnessed the application of the needed remedy. It certainly does not lie within the lines of thought developed by Mr. Mallock who would preach to the workingman that he is very well off indeed, if he only knew it; and is obtaining more than his fair share of the fruits of industry. "Injustice," iterates the Socialist, "continues to press heavily on the working classes; and matters will not cease to grow worse until you cut the root of the evil, that is, the present system of capitalism, in which the workers are robbed of the fruit of their toil, in order that the idle rich may live, not merely in comfort, but in boundless luxury and splendor." There can, he argues, be no adequate improvement obtained from the present political, economic and social constitution. The two great political parties? A plague o' both your houses; they, like the judiciary, the legislature and the executive are controlled by the money-bags. Individualism means capitalism;

and capitalism means, and will, till it is abolished, continue to mean the exploitation of the wage-earner in the interest of the money-owners! These ideas are set forth skilfully, in form best adapted to stir the blood and imagination of the workers and of those who resent the evils of the present condition. Parallel columns are drawn up. On one side, the factory-worker striving to feed a wife and children on six or seven dollars a week; the unhealthy factory and the still more unhealthy tenement or shanty; anaemic childhood and pauper old age; girls toiling for a pittance insufficient to support them, and the abodes of infamy recruited largely through the pressure of penury. On the other side, the five thousand dollar bulldog, the hundred thousand dollars paid for my lady's pearl necklace, or to decorate a church for a bridal ceremony; a million and a half spent on champagne in the public hosteleries of one city to welcome in the new year with its message of good will; the fortunes sunk to buy a European title for the daughter of some successful exploiter. The Socialist suffers from no lack of colors on his palette to cover the canvases that he presents to the labor world with "Look on this picture and on that." This attack on the abuses of capitalism and the injustices engendered by them is one feature of the Socialist campaign. If it were the only one, the duty of the Catholic Church to oppose the party would be much less obvious than it actually is. There is another feature, which is a downright warfare against religion and especially against the Catholic Church as the one consistent representative of the supernatural; and the great danger which threatens in many quarters of the country the welfare of Catholic flocks is that many Catholics see in Socialism only the former character, ignoring or denying altogether the existence of the latter. The term Socialism has acquired a vague, shifting, elastic signification which leads not merely to confusion but also to a great deal of pernicious deception. The pastor who finds himself called on to protect or rescue any of his people from the Socialist drift should know that he must, in the first place, be able to grasp and to expose the various ideas, doctrines, principles, programs, parties, as-

pirations, movements, which now in the aggregate, now separately, are designated under the terms Socialist and Socialism. In the second place he must be able to present the principles of Catholic ethics upon which may be based a program of social reform broad enough and deep enough to satisfy the aspirations of those whose Socialism consists in a very reasonable dissatisfaction with the abuses of the present condition, and a willingness to promote any movement that promises to bring about a salutary change.

What are the various implications gathered under the term Socialism? It means a certain economic theory regarding the production and the distribution of the material goods used for the satisfaction of human needs and desires. It means, in the second place, a philosophy of life, a sociology; and a scheme of social and political organization constructed upon this economic and its associated philosophic theory. Again, it means an organized party or parties, with a definite history behind them, that have advocated and prosecuted a movement to bring about the reconstruction of society in accordance with this economic and philosophic doctrine—that is, in the concrete, *the Socialists*. Again, Socialism is used to designate this party's immediate and ultimate programs; sometimes only the immediate; at other times, this or that measure proposed by the Socialists; and very frequently it simply means an attitude of sympathy with the provisional measures of social reform proposed by the party—and approved by many who are strongly and irrevocably opposed to socialist philosophy and to the party inasmuch as it is committed to that philosophy. Finally, not to pursue distinctions unnecessarily far, owing to the discordant oracles issued by the professed exponents of Socialism, quite disparate and even contrary ideas and programs are presented as being, respectively, the genuine tenets of the Socialist party. The Socialist party is atheistic, declares Mr. Jones, for has he not read Belfort Bax and Hyndman and Ferri and a long list of other Socialist authorities stretching back to Marx and Engels themselves, not to speak of the uninterrupted witness of the current socialist newspapers? Not at all, replies Mr.

Smith, you are mistaken; read Spargo and Kirkup; look at the official program of the American Socialists in 1910, in which they squarely affirm that the Socialist party is primarily an economic and political movement; and is not concerned with matters of religious belief. In a similar fashion Mr. Jones and Mr. Smith argue over the destruction of the family, free love, confiscation of private property, etc., etc., till the wordy duel ends with each party standing exactly where he stood at first, except that he has probably conceived a very low opinion of either the intellect or the sincerity of his adversary. Nowhere more than in serious discussion with persons who are inclined towards Socialism, but are not actually members of the Socialist party—with the genuine, confirmed Socialist argument is usually thrown away—is there profit to be reaped from keeping in mind the words of Locke: "If the idea be not agreed upon betwixt the speaker and the hearer for which the words stand the agreement is not about things but names. As often as such a word whose signification is not ascertained betwixt them comes into use their understandings have no other object wherein they agree but barely the sound; the things they think of at that time as expressed by the word being quite different."

Of Socialism properly speaking, that is, the professions and aims of the Socialist party, the economic theory may be said to be the very essence. That theory is formulated as follows by one of the foremost American exponents of the system today: "Socialism advocates the transfer of ownership in the social tools of production, the land, factories, machinery, railroads, mines, etc., from the individualist capitalist to the people to be operated for the benefit of all." This statement may be called the greatest common measure of every group or body that can lay claim to the name of Socialist. It was proposed by Marx, it continues to be the definition of the ultimate aim of the party to-day. Frequently the economic theory which is embodied in this principle is said to be the only doctrine maintained by official Socialism today as the basis of its activity and its practical program. Many a man who

approves Socialism believes that the movement and the party stand simply for the realization of the change advocated in this formula, along with some definite proposals in the way of provisional measures to bring this desideratum about. But unless we are ready to refuse credit to its most brilliant champions from Marx down, we must believe that Socialism, not the vague mental attitude, but concrete Socialism, the Socialist party, stands for a great deal more than the affirmation and realization of the purely economic theory, which, frequently, to the advantage of clear thinking, is conveniently called Collectivism.

Is Collectivism, in itself, isolated from any other kind of theory, immoral and irreligious? Speaking in the abstract, a community might without any violation of the principles of natural justice or the teachings of supernatural religion be organized on a collectivist basis. In such a community the land, the cattle, tools and implements, buildings, etc., might be owned in common; all the members should labor in their respective departments, and all receive their just share of the product. Individual and family rights might be respected, and everything go merrily as a marriage bell under this arrangement. Such was the system established in the missions of Paraguay. If sound moral and religious principles governed all or the greater part of the individuals comprising the community, however large, then the administration of the Commonwealth would be regulated with due consideration for both morals and religion. But the problem assumes a very different aspect when there is question of introducing such organization of society into a modern nation in which the entire social structure is constituted on the basis of private ownership. To reason effectively, however, with the man who is merely a Collectivist, though he may call himself a Socialist, the argument to be fruitful must be conducted on economic rather than on moral and religious grounds. The impracticability of Collectivism, owing to the difficulties of organizing labor, of assigning employment, of establishing a proper scale of remuneration, of finding an adequate motive to stimulate industry and thrift, has been lucidly and forcibly demonstrated by a

host of anti-Socialist writers. Even pure Collectivism, advocated without any admixture of directly immoral views regarding marriage and the family, is open to the charge that if established on a national scale it could not fail to be destructive of the most sacred bonds of family life. This charge will be strenuously denied by many sympathisers with Socialism, who are conscious of their own rectitude of purpose and conduct in this regard. But what would be the inevitable result on the institution of the family of setting up the state as the universal producer and provider may be easily inferred.

The second content of the term Socialism is a well-defined philosophy of life, and a scheme, not well defined in detail, but thoroughly clear in its principles, for the reorganization of society and the direction of all the members of the society in their individual capacity. This philosophic theory, historically speaking, has been presented by the founders and leaders of the Socialist party as the indispensable, logical, scientific foundation of Collectivism. The central doctrine of this philosophy is, it need not be said, the materialistic interpretation of history. This teaching is that the entire development of man and human society, all ideas and institutions, intellectual, moral and religious, have been originated and determined in their character by the successive conditions in which he found himself with regard to the production and distribution of the goods consumed in daily life. Man liveth physically and morally by bread alone, and not by any word that cometh out of the mouth of God. The Christian religion, therefore, its creed and its moral institutions are the efflorescence of the conditions that prevailed in economic production at the period when it made its appearance; its vicissitudes and development are to be ascribed to the same causes. And, as the economic system of individualism has almost run its course to yield to a new constitution of society, so, too, Christianity is doomed to disappear. It is, in fact, on its last legs:

“Though before thee the throned Cytherean,
Be fallen, and hidden her head,
Yet thy kingdom shall pass, Galilean,
Thy dead shall go down to the dead.”

All religion, indeed, is but a transitory device of evolution, which having played its part, sometimes beneficently, sometimes injuriously, in the great drama, has now become positively pernicious, because it would continue to persuade the victims of the present unjust capitalistic system, by worthless promissory notes drawn on a future life, to submit to their lot and leave the spoilers in peaceful possession of the cash of this present world. Volumes might be filled with quotations amplifying this view from an unbroken chain of Socialist writers in every decade from every country beginning with Marx and Engels, and reaching to but not ending with Mr. Bax and many of his American comrades. Let a sample of one of the most brilliant and cultivated of Socialists suffice here. Some Socialists and pro-Socialists occasionally assert that Socialism, meaning the principles of the organized Socialist party, are in harmony with Christianity. Let us hear Mr. Belfort Bax, who presumably knows what he is talking about:—"As to the ethical teaching of Christ, with its one-sided, introspective, and individualistic character, we venture to assert that no one acquainted with the theory of modern scientific Socialism can, for a moment, call it socialistic. Socialism aims rather at a rehabilitation in higher form of the classical utilitarian morality of public life. It has no sympathy with the morbid, eternally-revolving-upon-itself transcendent morality of the Gospel discourses. This morality like that of the whole Oriental movement of which it is a development, is essentially subjective, its criterion lying in the individual conscience, and its relation to a divinity supposed to reveal himself in it. It sets up a forced—to the vast majority, impossible—standard of 'personal holiness' which, when realized, has seldom resulted in anything but (1) an apotheosised priggism (*e. g.*, the Puritan type) or (2) in an epileptic hysteria (*e. g.*, the Catholic Saint type) and which at the best is a *tour de force* involving our wonder perhaps, like the concentrated physical energy of the tight-rope dancer, but which we feel to be just as useless."¹ The same author

¹ *The Religion of Socialism*. Ed. 1908, p. 97.

summarizes the common, if not quite universal testimony of Socialist writers as to the nature of their system: "Socialism has been well described as a new conception of the world, presenting itself in industry as coöperative Communism, in politics as international Republicanism, in religion as atheistic Humanism, by which is meant the recognition of social progress as our being's highest end and aim. The establishment of society on a Socialistic basis would imply the definitive abandonment of all theological cults, since the notion of a transcendent god or semi-divine prophet is but the counterpart and analogue of the transcendent governing class. . . . As the religion of slave industry was Paganism; as the religion of serfage was Catholic Christianity, or Sacerdotalism; as the religion of Capitalism is Protestant Christianity or Biblical Dogma; so the religion of collective and coöperative industry is Humanism, which is only another name for Socialism." ² When the Socialist comes to consider the Christian family and marriage his views are the complement and the logical corollaries of these pronouncements on religion. The author of the latest Socialist survey of the position of the party in America puts the case very euphemistically when she writes: "As has been seen, the economic interpretation of history dominates the Socialist philosophy, and no institution is therefore held permanently sacred; religion, the state, and the present form of the family are outgrowths of the bourgeois system, and as such are subject to change as were the corresponding institutions at the close of the classical period. In its external forms, at any rate, religion is allowed by the Socialist no exemption from criticism." ³

Now it is evident that no person enjoying the use of reason could for a moment cheat himself into the belief that he might continue to be a Catholic and yet entertain such ideas as the above on religion and morality; or that he could conscientiously become a member of a party pursuing such ideals and propagating through its current press and by its more permanent

² *Ib.*, p. 81.

³ *American Socialism of the Present Day.* HUGHAN, 1911, p. 160.

literature doctrines of the above type. Yet there are certainly honest Catholics who will tell you in all sincerity that they favor Socialism and see nothing in it contrary to Catholic faith. We have, for example, this view set forth very eloquently by Mr. Bliss, whose sincerity one may not question. Last summer, one of the most distinguished among English Catholic laymen, a learned judge, before a union of Catholic Young Men's Societies at which a bishop presided, vigorously expressed his conviction that Catholics are making a mistake in opposing Socialism on the grounds of religion and morality. The present writer has met more than one earnest intelligent Catholic wage-earner who gave it as his opinion that the movement has nothing to do with religion, nor with changing the character of marriage; and that the conditions aimed at by Socialism would affect the family relations only to place family life, among the working classes, on a worthier plane than the one it occupies today; the father would be in a position to provide decently for his family, and poverty or penury would cease to be the janitor to vice and degradation. "What," said a New York mechanic, who claimed to be a practical Catholic and to be strongly in favor of Socialism, "What danger to the faith of Catholics or to the Church would arise if the government were to take over all the coal mines, the cotton factories, the steel plants, the railways of the country?" This man might be taken as the type of a number of Catholics much more numerous than those who do not come into personal contact with wage earners are likely to imagine.

Here is a case to which wise old John's observation applies with its full force. In the mind of a Catholic who speaks in the strain quoted above the term Socialism stands for something quite different from its connotation in the text of Mr. Belfort Bax and the denunciation of Leo XIII and Pius X. The confusion rests mainly on the fact that, on one side, the economic theory of collectivism more or less restricted, and usually qualified with some provision for the indemnification of owners whose property would be socialized, is taken to be the be-all and the end-all of Socialism. On the other hand

it is assumed that the anti-religious Socialist philosophy and the economic theory are inseparably interwoven, and that this union, when we pass from the realm of abstract ideas, is a concrete reality in the Socialist party. As long as the Catholic merely favors Collectivism pure and simple, in what might be called dilettante fashion, no great harm can come to him. The danger begins when he comes to think that the Socialist party, its spirit, its aims and its tenets are completely embraced in the economic theory alone, and adequately reflected in its published programs. Now the important question, is, which of these two estimates, that of the Popes and Bax and a host of other Socialists, or that of some Socialists and some non-Socialists is the true one?

That the materialistic, anti-religious philosophy already outlined has been identified with the Socialist movement from its inception is undeniable. It was formulated by Marx and Engels as the basis on the strength of which they laid claim to the designation of "scientific" for their Socialism. We have noted Miss Hugan's testimony that it is, today, still recognized by the American Socialists as the keystone of their system. Take up the catalogue of Socialist works, large and small, issued by Chas. P. Kerr and Co., of Chicago, the official publishers of the Socialist party, and you will observe that if you eliminate the books and pamphlets which preach materialism, determinism, agnosticism, or atheism, the residuum will be negligible. The materialistic interpretation of history "is universally accepted among American Socialists, and is employed in all their literature, from the constructivist pages of Robert Hunter to the revolutionary pamphlets of Debs and Hanford." ⁴

Evidently the Catholic who favors Socialism holds it guiltless of any distinct antagonism to religion; and he disregards as unsound the philosophic reasonings which infer that an established Collectivism would result in injury to our present family life. He reaches this mental attitude through two causes,—the first is, that he believes some drastic reform of

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 55.

the present abuses has become imperative; the second, that this conviction prompts him to lend a friendly ear to any pleas that would exculpate Socialism, which seems to him to be the only movement that promises a radical remedy for the situation, from the charge of irreligion and immorality. And he finds a considerable volume of testimony to this effect, from within and without. Some Socialists, as for instance, Mr. Kirkup, protest that there is no necessary or essential connexion between Socialism and irreligion: "The connexion of Socialism with views of this nature is purely an accident; with regard to the prevalence of anti-Christian feeling in Socialist schools it should be remembered that Socialism has flourished chiefly on the continent where the defection of the mass of the people from the creeds and churches is much more pronounced than in this country. Continental socialists are not more anti-Christian than continental liberals"; "Is there," said somebody, dwelling on this point, "anything to choose between the individualist Clemenceau and the Socialist, Jaurès?" The opinion is frequently urged that Socialism is only now beginning to find itself, and that it is steadily disentangling itself from those radical anti-religious principles which its founders and the infidel groups which composed its early membership, and still constitute the majority in its ranks, associated with the purely economic theory. Your socialist-inclined Catholic quotes with an air of finality the statement of the Chicago Platform of 1910: "The Socialist Party is primarily an economic and political movement. It is not concerned with matters of religious belief." He has probably never perused the report of the convention which proves plainly just what that declaration, which was adopted as a mere piece of expediency, is worth. In like manner there abound statements from Socialists of note to the effect that the arraignment of Socialism as a foe to the family is false and preposterous. For instance, the following from Mr. Victor Berger: "The story that Socialism will destroy the family is one of the lies brought up against every reform movement." The platform of a party, however, is to be interpreted by the general

principles and policy of the party; and isolated expressions of this or that member weigh but little against a massive sustained body of testimony, official and individual, which expresses the convictions and aims that permeate the party as an organized movement. If the stories that the Socialist party stands for the destruction of religion and the abolition of the Christian family are lies, then the sons of Ananias who have industriously and persistently circulated these stories, through the press of every country are Marx, Bebel, Hyndman, Bax, Kautsky, Ferri and a host of other Socialists who have been and who are much more powerful in the shaping of Socialist ideals and directing Socialist activities than is the clever member of Congress from the fifth district of Wisconsin. The assertion that ultimately Socialism will be purged of its irreligious leaven and will abandon its traditional philosophy belongs to the realm of prophecy, and hence is not susceptible of proof or disproof. One, however, has but to peruse occasionally the various party organs to find ample reasons for the conviction that this process of expurgation will not be effected through the coöperation or with the consent of the present generation of Socialists.

What, above everything else, tends to throw the anti-religious element of organized Socialism into the background is the gradually increasing predominance in the party of the Constructivist type of thought over the Revolutionist; or the moderate over the Radical. These divisions do not, it seems, constitute two distinctly defined parties in the camp, for both agree on the basic principle of the socialization of capital. But they respectively advocate different lines of immediate procedure. The definitions presented by the Socialist writer already cited, will sufficiently indicate the two varieties. To condense the description, the Revolutionist, true to the mind of Marx, believes that the present capitalistic system must fall by the very evolution of things, and fall comparatively soon. Consequently he is but little concerned in trying to win through legislation various measures of amelioration for the benefit of the working classes; instead, he aims principally at obtaining wider political

rights and to create stronger self-consciousness in the working classes and otherwise to prepare them for the inevitable struggle that is to usher in the Socialistic régime. The Evolutionist, on the other hand, though the ultimate goal of his ambition and effort is the establishment of a Socialistic society on the basis of collective ownership, expects to reach that goal step by step. Consequently the program set forth is a series of legislative measures to be fought for at once by means of the legal and political weapons now available. The strength of this latter policy is perceived in the tendency to be silent on the anti-Christian tenets belonging to the party; and to make the official programs, after a formal proclamation of the collectivist doctrine, in somewhat qualified form, recognizing the right of ownership in goods of consumption to consist chiefly of measures that might all be advocated as steps of social reform on an individualistic basis. Consider, for example, the character of the last program of the Internationalist Socialist Party. Apart from some articles bearing on the party organization and administration, the main contents were: Coöperation, Arbitration, Disarmament, Unemployment, Capital Punishment, Labor Protective Legislation. The program of the American Socialists embraces various measures tending directly to improve the condition of the working classes, such as shortening the hours of labor, factory inspection, restrictions on child labor; political measures to establish a pure democracy, including universal suffrage, the initiative, the referendum and the recall; administrative measures like a graduated income tax and free administration of justice.

Naturally many Catholic wage-earners are attracted by this program and fully approve of it. Taking it as a comprehensive manifesto of the creed of Socialism they do not hesitate to call themselves Socialists, though they may not belong to the party at all. But they are in a fair way of being drawn into it; and when they begin to take an interest in Socialist literature they are in danger of losing their faith. Their pastors and other instructors must endeavor to convince them of the true character of the Socialist party; and denounce its

irreligious character. But these guides need also to point out how genuine Social Reform, embracing nearly if not all the above-mentioned measures might be realized without having recourse to Socialism at all. Harm rather than good may easily come of well-meant but misdirected denunciation. Here it is worth citing the caution given by an eminent priest who is conversant with the conditions that hold regarding controversy on this subject: "Such controversy has its uses, and the increase of Socialism no doubt calls for destructive criticism on the part of those capable of supplying it. Yet this criticism is not without its difficulties. It demands extreme caution and a wide range of knowledge. Mistakes (even in detail), exaggerations, or misrepresentations are apt to discredit the whole subject in the eyes of those who think they know better. Moreover our sources of information are not always reliable—or, if reliable, they may refer to conditions which prevail elsewhere or to systems which no longer find supporters."⁵ Especially the critic of Socialism must take care to gauge his man, so as to understand clearly whether he is a downright Socialist, accepting the whole sweep of the party's philosophical and economic theories, or is merely one who approves of drastic social reform. Against the former kind of opponent such books as *The Case against Socialism*, or *The Nation of Fatherless Children* are arsenals of serviceable citations, but persons of the other class, who frequently call themselves Socialists, occupy a position beyond the range of such ammunition. With these, denunciation of the materialistic interpretation of history and of the Socialist professions of free love are but a loss of time; they will usually be inclined to listen only to the economic criticism of Collectivism.

Even when attacking Collectivism apart from the philosophy, prudence requires that we select our arguments with discrimination from the abundance of literature that is published against Socialism. You address yourself to a socialistically inclined workingman, confident that you will completely cap-

⁵ *The Month*, February, 1908, p. 113.

ture him; for have you not at your fingers' ends the convincing exposition of So and So who shows how the Socialist State could not possibly solve practically any of the three great problems that it would have to face. Your adversary, if he is well up on his side of the question, will coolly inform you that you are knocking to pieces a man of straw which the enemies of Socialism have set up; that though some individual Socialists have sketched in detail the working machinery of the coöperative commonwealth, such plans have no official authority; that "it is contrary to Marxian principles to attempt to give detailed specifications of the coming state." Another pitfall to be avoided is the contradictory character of some of the reasonings which are advanced against the enemy. For example one writer who has recently published a sincere little book for the benefit of workingmen declares that with the advent of Socialism the working classes would degenerate into armies of lazy idlers who would eat at the expense of the State; yet, another contemporary publication draws a picture of the slavery into which the wage-earners would be inevitably reduced under the tyranny of a Socialist bureaucracy. The Socialist scores a palpable hit by simply setting pairs of such arguments as these one against the other; and he finds no lack of such ineptitudes in our anti-Socialist literature. Again, you cite some Socialist who has declared that capital shall be socialized by confiscation pure and simple; you are answered by another statement of some other Socialist, equally competent, or incompetent, to speak for the party, who proposes some scheme of compensation for the present owner. And so the wrangle goes on with no satisfactory result; your adversary is probably all the more set in his opinions, and is very sure that he knows more about the matter than you do.

To retain the loyalty of the wage-earners among our Catholic people, we have one powerful resource which does not seem to be sufficiently utilized. That is, we can advocate consistently with Catholic moral principles a movement of social reform broad enough and deep enough to win and retain the sympathies of these Catholics who are drawn towards Socialism. To

put it tersely, we can, if we wish, take the wind out of the Socialist sails. The basic Socialist thought, which gives strength to the movement, is that the goods of the nation belong to the people as a whole; and that under the present system the people at large are deprived of their rights for the benefit of the few. Therefore the Socialist would overthrow the present organization of society to substitute another that might succeed if men were to become such perfectly good beings as was Rousseau's primeval man. The premises are true; the Socialist conclusion is a fallacy of *non sequitur*.

The true remedy which the Catholic Church, along with all sound conservatives, has to prescribe for the present evils is not merely or exclusively to preach the doctrine of Christian charity. That the teachings of Christ if put in practice by capitalists and employes, bourgeoisie and proletariat, would prove a panacea for the injustices of the present system, is an undisputable truth. But the prospect⁶ of the Spirit of Christ presiding over Wall Street, and the boards of directors of the great trusts and industries of all kinds, over the depart-

⁶The following excerpts from the official Report of the Hearings before the Committee on Investigation of the United States Steel Corporation (pp. 2246-2247) illustrates the consideration extended to the moral law in the world of finance and commerce:—

"Mr. BARTLETT. Is it your opinion that the men who engage in the monopoly and the combination ought not to have a conscience?

Mr. CARNEGIE. If there be no law—

Mr. BARTLETT (interposing). Statute law, you mean?

Mr. CARNEGIE. There, Judge, you come into another atmosphere. I do not know what the statute law is.

Mr. BARTLETT. You do not think, then, that there is any moral obligation on the part of men engaged in the manufacture and selling of products not to charge extortionate prices?

Mr. CARNEGIE. On the contrary, I think that when a man is appointed to run a business and has the interests of his shareholders at stake, it is his business to get the best return he can from the property he is managing; always provided he breaks no law.

Mr. BARTLETT. Provided he breaks no public law.

Mr. CARNEGIE. Yes.

Mr. BARTLETT. And there would be no limit to the extent to which trade and commerce would go in the way of extortionate prices or combinations or pools but for the restraining hand of the law?

ment stores and the sweat shops is, to say the least, somewhat remote. In the days of the Church's greatest influence, over Christendom, however, she did not entrust the observance of the precept *Thou shalt not kill*, or any other portion of the decalogue to charity alone. The *ought* of the Gospel was backed up by the *must* of the civil arm. Those who feel the pressure of the grievances arising from present day abuses and iniquities are not always inclined to listen patiently to exhortations addressed to them on the text of, "Blessed are those that suffer, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven." The Socialist derides such advice and exhibits it to prove his calumny that the Church is the servant of the rich. We are all pleased when we hear that some magnate, like a recently deceased senator of the United States who was taken by the cartoonist as the symbol of the corporations, has patronisingly said that the Catholic Church is the great bulwark of the nation against Socialism. But we are perhaps not less pleased by such remarks from such sources than the Socialist who repeats them with a significant "I told you so."

If, along with the due inculcation of the precept of charity and the Church's teaching on the sacred rights of property, our labor organizations, workmen's clubs and our Catholic population generally heard more frequently than they do the complementary doctrine regarding the limitations of ownership they would be less likely to be imposed upon by Socialist misrepresentation. The theory which lies at the bottom of the present abuses of individualism is that the owner is absolute master

MR. CARNEGIE. You say there would be no limit?

MR. BARTLETT. Yes.

MR. CARNEGIE. That is too much to say.

MR. BARTLETT. Would there be any limit?

MR. CARNEGIE. Well, now, wait—

MR. BARTLETT. I will wait.

MR. CARNEGIE. I have stated that human nature is such that laws to prevent larceny are indispensable.

MR. BARTLETT. That has been an old law that has come clear down from Sinai.

MR. CARNEGIE. I think it has been revised several times since that time. [Laughter.] What are your lawyers worth if they can not improve a law that was given as far back as at Sinai?"

of his goods, to use them, or abuse them, as he pleases. This view has never been Catholic doctrine. It is in direct opposition to the latter, which is that as all men have a right to a living from the great storehouse provided by the Creator, this right is higher than, and antecedent to the right of private ownership. When in the case of some individuals this general right of theirs, by some positive fact, such as occupancy in a state of nature, or an enactment of social authority in an organized society, is converted into a definite right of ownership, this individual definite right does not extinguish the general right of all, and does not withdraw the acquired goods from the scope of that right. "The material goods," says St. Thomas, "which God commits to a man are his, certainly, as regards ownership; but with regard to use they are not his, but others' also who can be sustained by what is superfluous for him." When a great portion of the nation's property is so administered by its owners that a large proportion of the people are deprived of the opportunity of obtaining a decent living or a just remuneration for their labor, then the general right is violated and it becomes the duty of the State to protect the commonwealth by making such regulations and imposing such restrictions as will rectify the injustice. Practically, in the present system as it operates now, the man who has nothing but his hands or his brains to make a living for himself is not looked upon as having any rights at all to the goods of the country or nation. Even the right to work, as Fr. Kelleher puts it in his recent able little book on the subject of ownership, is denied them when men are driven to compulsory idleness. Nor is the case radically different when they are compelled, by grim necessity, to work for a wage inadequate to a decent livelihood. The doctrine that the entire community has a claim on the entire goods of the community is set forth in the following statement, without any whittling away. "All laws of property must stand upon the foot of the general advantage; for a country belongs to its inhabitants; and in what proportion and by what rules its inhabitants are to own its property must be settled by the law; and the moment a fragment of the people set up right as inherent within themselves

and not founded upon the public good, plain absurdities follow; for laws of property are, like all other laws, to be changed when the public good requires it." The next lines deserve to be put in italics,—“It would be well indeed that the owners of property in land or money from the largest to the smallest, should recognize that their title to enjoyment of it must rest upon the same foundation, and that the modes and means of their enjoyment of the common stock of the State, if it injures the State, can no more be defended and will no more be endured by a free people than any other public mischief or nuisance.” These are the words of no soap-box Socialist, but of a late Lord Chief Justice of England. If the aroused spirit of the working people which is set upon the abolition or reduction of the evils that permeate the present system is not to be permitted to swell the ranks of the Socialist party then it is incumbent on us to present an efficient alternative of social reform, based upon the above principle of common law and sound ethics, viz., the claim of all to a living from the total property of the nation and the right of the State to regulate production and industry with a view to safeguarding that claim. Mr. Chesterton—it is the fashion just now to quote Mr. Chesterton—has ventured to say some very plain words to his conservative fellow-countrymen on this point.—“If they want a domestic England they must ‘shell out,’ as the phrase goes, to a vastly greater extent than any radical politician has yet dared to suggest; they must endure burdens much heavier than the Budget and strokes much deadlier than the death duties; for the thing to be done is nothing more nor less than the destruction of the great fortunes and great estates. We can now only avoid Socialism by a change as vast as Socialism. If we are to save property we must distribute property almost as sternly as did the French Revolution. If we are to preserve the family we must revolutionize the nation.” Socialist ideas have not yet spread so widely in this country as to render the above estimate applicable to the situation here. But, twenty years ago in England Mr. Chesterton’s words would have been regarded as a symptom of lunacy.

JAMES J. FOX.

THE CLOUDS AROUND SHAKESPEARE.¹

In *The Catholic University Bulletin* for December, 1909, I devoted five pages to an analysis of Father O'Neill's pamphlet, *Could Bacon have written the Plays?* At the end of that review I penned the following paragraph:—

“One wonders whether Father O'Neill, having seemingly settled to his own satisfaction the point as to whether Bacon *could* have written the Shakespeare plays, will take the next obvious, though not necessarily logical, step, and essay to prove that he *did* write them. Should he do so, he will be a strong accession to the ranks of the Baconians.”

Well, if we are to draw inferences from his latest publication, the distinguished Professor of English Language and Philology in University College, Dublin, has made considerable progress in the anticipated direction. He is not yet an out-and-out Baconian: he professes in fact to hold a position somewhere between the contending Stratfordian and Baconian armies; but that position is no middle one, for he is evidently much nearer to the insurgents than he is to the standpatters or regulars.

That he has not definitely joined the Baconians may indeed be of some significance. In the pamphlets he has so far published he has attempted to prove two things, namely, (1) that Bacon could have written the plays, and (2) that Shakespeare could have written neither the plays nor the poems. Is he now seeking a *via media*? Will he, Warwick-like, set up yet another rival claimant to the literary throne? In a Postscript to his *Clouds* Father O'Neill quotes Professor Dowden thus:—

¹*The Clouds Around Shakespeare. A Lecture Delivered before the Royal Dublin Society, February 22nd, 1911. By the Rev. George O'Neill, S. J., M. A., Author of "Could Bacon have written the Plays?" Dublin: E. Ponsonby, Ltd., 116 Grafton Street. Pp. 38. Price 6d.*

"The Shakespeare of each portrait-painter resembles the Shakespeare of the rest with quite as close a resemblance as portraits commonly possess which are drawn from a real face at different points of view by artists 'indifferent honest,'"

and then goes on to say:—

"I am quite ready to accept this view. But what actual living Elizabethan personage do these consentient portraits fit? That is the question towards answering which the present lecture and its predecessor ('Could Bacon have written the Plays?') are intended to help."

It is possible that we are on the eve of a startling three-cornered controversy.

However that may be, what at present clearly emerges is that Father O'Neill, if not exactly pro-Bacon, is most emphatically anti-Shakespeare. With mingled feelings, but much more in sorrow than in anger, do I chronicle this fall from grace. We of the true Shakespeare faith can ill afford to lose so keen a contestant, for, as I pointed out on a former occasion, the Dublin Professor is a doughty champion, wielding the weapon of a pitiless and inexorable logic with a deftness and a skill that enable him with ease to pink an opponent who is even for a moment off his guard.

A perusal of his latest publication will make this plain. A piece of writing more destructive of Shakespeare's claims has never before been put together in so small a compass. To the mind of one unacquainted with the arguments *per contra* it could not fail to carry conviction: nay, even to one who was acquainted with those arguments, but who was not at the same time a skilled dialectician, it would probably give reason for pause and supply material for doubt. Father O'Neill produces his general effect by bringing together into a compact whole some of the strongest reasonings of the anti-Shakespeare school. He lays no claim to originality of research, he puts forward no discoveries of his own. What he does show is singular mastery in the art of submitting closely knit arguments, great ability in his method of presentation, and wonderful powers of lucidity and condensation.

Of necessity in a scheme like this we are brought over more or less familiar ground. The unreliability of the portraits of Shakespeare; the puzzling character of Ben Jonson's various references to him; the improbability that an uneducated man like Shakespeare, whose youth was so wild and erratic, whose later life was spent in sordid money-getting and in petty law-suits, who so far as records show never owned any books, should have written poems and plays that evince wide reading and an intimate acquaintance with practically all forms of ancient and modern learning; and the display of authorities on one side of the question or the other—these are the materials, handled with consummate skill, out of which Father O'Neill has constructed his really splendid mosaic of argumentation.

Beginning with the portraits, he discards them all but the engraving by Martin Droeshout which appeared on the title-page of the folio edition of the plays published in 1623. Concerning this picture he states the opinion that, although highly eulogised by Ben Jonson, it is "no representation of any human face whatever, but the portrait of a mere mask," and that it presents to us the front of one shoulder and the back of the other. This is nearly, if not quite, a restatement in another way of the declaration by Sir Edwin Durning-Lawrence, whom Father O'Neill mentions among his authorities, that the Droeshout portrait is "cunningly composed of two left arms and a mask."²

Both Sir Edwin and Father O'Neill lay particular stress on Ben Jonson's lines printed on the fly-leaf opposite to this portrait in the folio of 1623. These lines, which are a sort of puff preliminary, written presumably to order and not under any feeling of inspiration, are very ordinary and display no special merit. They have the advantage, however, of appearing to most people to possess a particularly plain meaning and to be incapable of being twisted or tortured into any cabalistic symbol for the shrouding of deep mysteries. As I find they are not very well known, it may be useful to set them down here:—

² *Bacon is Shakspeare*, by Sir Edwin Durning-Lawrence, Bart. New York, 1910. Pp. viii + 286. See Chap. II., p. 23.

To the Reader.

This Figure, that thou here seeft put,
 It vvvas for gentle Shakeſpeare cut;
 Wherein the Grauer had a ſtrife
 With Nature, to out-doo the life:
 O, could he but haue dravvne his vvrit
 As vvvel in braffe, as he hath hit
 His face; the Print would then ſurpaſſe
 All, that vvvas euer vvrit in braffe.
 But, ſince he cannot, Reader, looke
 Not on his Picture, but his Booke.

B. I.

Sir Edwin Durning-Lawrence, by interpreting "hit" in line 6 to mean "hid" and "out-doo the life" in line 4 to mean "doo-out the life" and that again to mean "shut out the real face of the living man," draws the conclusion that the verses and portrait taken together "clearly reveal the true facts, that the author is writing left-handedly, that means secretly, in shadow, with his face hidden behind a mask or pseudonym," and that "the real face is hidden."³ Of a piece with this conclusion is Sir Edwin's further deduction that, because Ben Jonson's lines, from "To the Reader" to "B. I.," both inclusive, contain in all 287 letters—that is, if, with him, you count the two w's in line 8 as four letters but each other w as one letter—the "Great Author" meant to reveal himself to the world 287 years after 1623, namely, in 1910, the date of Sir Edwin's work, *Bacon is Shake-Speare*.⁴ That surely is argumentation run mad. Father O'Neill has the good sense not to commit himself to the acceptance of either of these fantastic conclusions, contenting himself with merely putting the following conundrums:—

"What is the meaning of this riddling effigy? Why does it show us a mask? Why does it face both ways at once? And what was Ben Jonson's real mind about it when he wrote those ambiguous laudatory verses?"

Obvious answers to his questions would be that the effigy is no riddling one at all, that it does not show a mask, that it

³ *Op. cit.*, Chap. II., p. 29.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, Chap. II., pp. 29, 30.

does not face both ways at once, and that Ben Jonson's laudatory verses, whatever else they are, are by no means ambiguous. Droeshout was a very young man in 1623—about 22 years old—and he never attained to any great eminence in his art. The faults in his engraving, as pointed out and I think exaggerated by Father O'Neill—the "horizontal plane of collar, appalling to behold," the neck which "must be about a foot long behind," the chest suggesting "the last stages of consumption," the "bulging forehead," and the "wooden expression of the countenance"—may lawfully be attributed to the want of experience and skill of the engraver, who, in addition, may have been drawing from a poor picture or from a picture of Shakespeare made up for a part in some play. As for the shoulders, I lay no claim to being a sartorial expert, but at the same time I must say a careful examination of the plates printed by Sir Edwin Durning-Lawrence in his book fails to convince me that this portion of the case has been made out. Is he, or is Father O'Neill, or is any of us sufficiently acquainted with the costume of the Elizabethan and Jacobean age to be able to dogmatise concerning its fine points and details? I could, if I chose, judging merely by the shape of the outer garment, raise exactly similar doubts about the portrait of Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex, in the National Gallery, or the portrait of Ben Jonson in the Bodleian Library.

It is scarcely necessary to point out the extreme improbability of the existence of a conspiracy between Jonson, Droeshout, Heminge and Condell, Blount and Jaggard, and the Earls of Pembroke and Montgomery to foist upon the reading public so gross a deception as the Baconians must of necessity attribute to them in this whole matter of the folio of 1623; or the extreme difficulty of keeping secret a conspiracy which was shared by so many, if it did in reality exist.

Father O'Neill gets away from the subject by the statement that "Portraits, however, are, after all, of minor importance in so momentous an inquiry"; and perhaps, without further elaboration of the point, we may as well take him at his word.

Noting the general agreement that exists among Baconians

and Stratfordians alike that the bulk of the plays, *Venus and Adonis*, *The Rape of Lucrece*, and the Sonnets have proceeded from one and the same pen, Father O'Neill reminds us that Hallam expressed a wish that the Sonnets had never been written, and that there are still some who on ethical grounds eagerly question the identity of authorship, their doubts being crystallised in Mr. Lloyd Mifflin's sonnet:—

I will not do thy memory the wrong
Quite to believe that thou didst write these things.
Could the "sweet swan of Avon" soil his wings
With the green scum of these dark pools of song
Whose currents crawl that doubtful land along,
By newt and jewelled toad and snake that clings,
Through dank and rotting marshes, where upsprings
Seldom a lily, all those weeds among?
Words of great poets, pure as peaks of snow,
Should stand up through the ages. That hot strife
'Tween flesh and soul should still unwritten go.
Can we believe that thou, with evil rife,
Wast slave of grovelling passions, dark and low;
Thou!—in the mire and on the heights of life!

Father O'Neill, while reprobating the morals of the Sonnets and incidentally the doctrine of "Art for Art's sake," appears to hold the belief that they were composed by the man known as Shakespeare, whoever that Shakespeare was; and then through seven pages of close reasoning he devotes himself to the purpose of proving that the author who wrote such exquisite English, who showed cultured familiarity with the philosophic ideas of Plato, who appeared to know Greek well enough to give elegant paraphrases of epigrams from the Greek anthology, who was on terms of intimacy with persons of the highest rank and dignity, could not have been the illiterate scapegrace that fled from the country to London to escape the severities of the law, the money-grubber, the "rude groom," the "fourth-rate theatrical person," such as he maintains the real William Shakespeare of Stratford-on-Avon to have been.

In similar strain he deals with Shakespeare's claims to the authorship of *Venus and Adonis*, *The Rape of Lucrece*, and *Love's Labour's Lost*. The main feature of his argument is

that a person of no education or even of poor education could not have written these works because they are "steeped in the allusions, thought, and feelings of Latin and Greek poetry, enriched with spoils from the French *Pléiade* and the Italian *Seicentisti*," and because from many points of view they bear the ear-marks of the "literary aristocrat" and of one who knew foreign politics, court life, and great variety of books. Later on in the pamphlet the usual stress is laid on the encyclopedic knowledge possessed by the writer of the plays regarding law, medicine, falconry, hunting, navigation, agriculture, philosophy, and history, and the inference is drawn that such knowledge was beyond the range of the untutored youth from Stratford.

In all this it appears to me that sufficient account is not taken of the possibility or even probability that Shakespeare may have been a pupil at the free grammar school at Stratford, to which as the son of his father, Alderman Shakespeare, he would have been entitled to admission, and there acquired the foundation on which the superstructure of his literary attainments was afterwards raised; that he may have been a school-master in the country, as Aubrey says he was; and that Ben Jonson, in ascribing to him "small Latin and less Greek," seems to imply that he knew something of both languages. With regard to this last point I ought to say that what would seem small to Jonson, who was a very learned man, may have been relatively large; and, besides, the way one classicist has of belittling the attainments of another may be supposed to have been as well known and practised in the spacious days of great Elizabeth as it undoubtedly is in our own, for human nature is a constant quantity.

But, above all, what Father O'Neill, and with him all Baconians, leave out of account is the facility that genius has of overcoming difficulties: in fact, to overcome difficulties may be taken as one of the hall-marks of genius. It will be conceded by everyone as axiomatic that the writer of the poems and plays had unsurpassed genius; that writer was until quite modern times unhesitatingly recog-

nised to be William Shakespeare of Stratford-on-Avon and so recognised not only by the bulk of the people but by great poets, thinkers, and critics—by Milton, Dryden, Pope, Samuel Johnson, Voltaire, Lessing, Goethe, Coleridge, Victor Hugo—and why deny that Shakespeare alone of all world-geniuses was able to overcome the difficulties of his up-bringing, his youthful wildness, his sordid environment, and equip himself mentally for the outpouring of his spirit, the expression of his thoughts, in immortal verse? Sir Edward Sullivan puts the argument on this point so finely that I may be pardoned for quoting one of his paragraphs:—

“That it was possible,” he says, “for a man of more or less humble origin, and of deficient educational training, who happened to be endowed naturally with poetic gifts of a high order, coupled with an inborn instinct for the drama, to attain a great position in literature, is, unfortunately for the Baconians, a thing which we know could be accomplished. The manner in which it was accomplished, at least in one historical instance, deserves in this connection to be more widely known than it seems to be. I refer to the life of Plautus, the famous Roman playwright, the circumstances of whose origin, early struggles, and ultimate success so closely resemble what we know of Shakespeare’s career as to form one of the most striking parallels in the literary history of the world.”⁵

He then goes on to tell the life story of Plautus, a story which of itself ought to put the defamers of Shakespeare out of court for ever.

Father O’Neill’s zeal has led him, in dealing with this aspect of the Shakespearean question, into the I am sure unintentional unfairness of giving a garbled quotation, that is, a quotation away from its context. In endeavouring to confute Professor Saintsbury, who in Chapters VIII. and IX. of Volume V. of *The Cambridge History of English Literature* treats of Shakespeare’s life, plays, and poems, he tells us, first, that Mr. Saintsbury has discarded as valueless all but one of the traditional explanations as to Shakespeare’s learning or lack of

⁵ From article “The Defamers of Shakespeare” in *The Nineteenth Century* for March, 1909, Vol. LXV., p. 424.

learning—a thing, by the way, which a careful reading of the passage will show Mr. Saintsbury has not done—and then proceeds to demolish that one “rock” to which the Edinburgh professor clings. In order to do this he gives and comments on the following quotation from Chapter VIII.:—

“A lawyer of moderate intelligence and no extraordinary education will get up, on his brief, at a few days’ notice, more knowledge of an extremely technical kind than Shakespeare shows on any one point, and will repeat the process in regard to almost any subject. A journalist of no greater intelligence and education will, at a few hours’ or minutes’ notice, deceive the very elect in the same way.”

Now, the full paragraph from Mr. Saintsbury is as follows:—

“The difficulty comes from a surprising mixture of ignorance and innocence. A lawyer of moderate intelligence and no extraordinary education will get up, on his brief, at a few days’ notice, more knowledge of an extremely technical kind than Shakespeare shows on any one point, and will repeat the process in regard to almost any subject. A journalist of no greater intelligence and education will, at a few hours’ or minutes’ notice, deceive the very elect in the same way. Omniscience, no doubt, is divine; but *multiscience*—especially *multiscience* a little scratched and admitting through the scratches a sea-coast to Bohemia and knowledge of Aristotle in Ulysses—is quite human. What is wonderful is not what, in the book sense, Shakespeare knew, but what he did and was. And the man—whoever he was—who wrote what Shakespeare wrote would have had not the slightest difficulty in knowing what Shakespeare knew.”

I submit that Father O’Neill’s quotation is made to bear quite a different interpretation when read in conjunction with its context.

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I find that I have gone into more detail than I originally intended; but the subject is fascinating and lures one on. As it is, there are still many points that I must leave untouched. It will be seen that I agree with Father O’Neill in scarcely any of his conclusions; but that does not prevent me from

bearing willing testimony to the learning and ability and the dialectic skill he has displayed. I heartily commend his little book to the perusal of those who are interested in the Shakespeare question. Whether they accept or reject his reasoning, they will, I feel sure, agree with me when I say that he has provided a great sixpenceworth. There are but few who will not gain information from it, and there are scarcely any who will not have previous knowledge presented from a new angle. It is eminently a book to make one *think*: I need say no more in its praise.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF "THE HOUND OF HEAVEN."

Francis Thompson's life and work is yet another example of the principle of dying to live. The hard facts of the workaday world ground him as the outsider is ground who goes foolishly within reach of the factory wheel-web or the whirr of its mighty machinery. He had not the gift whereby we get things done: the gift whereby you and I see that a certain work is for to-day and that to-day must see that certain work through. The time he should have spent in earning sixpences and shillings he devoted to the seeing of visions and the dreaming of dreams. So much the worse for him, the singer; so much the better for us, the readers of his song. He had to go down into the depths that his song might live, but now his song goes on its way singing to you and to me, and to those who are to come after us forever.

Too much one side of his nature was stimulated, perhaps, so that he could not see the need of the passing hour. But in its stead, he saw the things that are shut out from duller minds. His spirit loved to soar in the sun, and even in the sun's unclouded rays, its eye was not abashed. The remorseless inquiry of each star came to him in the dark night of London, when he was alone, and the too, too powerful world was against him: and it tried him in its bitter tests, but, at the last, it gave him vision. So he saw what other men could see not, and his ear was keen to detect things to which the other ears were deaf:

Yea, in the night, my soul, my daughter,
Cry clinging heaven by the hems;
And lo, Christ walking on the waters,
Not of Gennesareth, but Thames.

The material world was a thin veil for such a one, to shut out the spirit world that lurks beyond, but that for most men, alas, too rarely peeps through. Arguments are for the philoso-

pher: syllogisms for the man of logic; tests and experiments for the scientist: but for the poet are feelings, emotions, and ardours, and of all these Francis Thompson had his fill. What we of to-day read in the pages of Billot and Satolli, and what long ago was written and fixed forever by the Angelic Doctor in spacious forms that at once satisfy our mind and allow room for the *obsequium rationale* of our faith came to him too, but clothed in quite other guise. Analyse it, and reduce it to its ultimate and you have but the same thing in "The Hound of Heaven" that heads an *articulus* or furnishes forth a *quaestio* in the "*Summa*"; but turn aside from your analysis, and meet the poet on his own terms, as he is entitled to be met, and all is different. Before you had the coal, meet indeed, for the furnace, but in dead lumps; now you have the vivid heat that glows and lightens your eyes by its rich reflections, while it warms your heart with its healthy flame. The ideas before were lying down in the sleep of cold logic: now they are abroad in the world, they march up the hillside, they feel the force of the breeze, they bound with vigour and they thrill with joy. Such life is contagious: the ideas are no longer dead: they go forth conquering and to conquer, for it is the voice of the Angel of the Schools, and it sings with the finest rapture of Shakespearean song.

Yet its idea is one that, to the unwitting reader, might seem old and merely earth-born. An Edinburgh Reviewer in a most appreciative article, when the poem was published, thought he found the same idea in Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus, and all the herd, who practiced the proud aloofness of the Stoic School. The things of the world lured them, they beckoned them with affectionate looks and called to them with appealing gestures to come; but the spirit of these men was strong, and their soul steeled against the charms of earth, and it was theirs to keep themselves unspotted by the world. Matthew Arnold has preached the panegyric of them all in his graceful quatrain:—

We do not ask who pined unseen,
Who were on action hurled,
Whose one boast is that all have been
Unspotted by the world.

These are a noble band as they stand, lonely, aside from the onward rush of history; the world is better, too, that such men as they have lived, for they with their mortifications and denials are a constant rebuke to the Epicurean tribe, whose one poor wish is to gather the rosebuds, while they may, and to suck the sweetness of the passing hour. Yet of that kind is not Francis Thompson: he will not walk in their company; his antecedents are different: in another school he learned his lesson, and the lesson itself is different far.

Still we should do wrong to blame this Reviewer, who has praised our poet. He saw the good that was in Francis Thompson, in so far as it fitted into his own world view, and, if he failed to see the other richer good, let us not ascribe to ill-will, what flowed but from the limits of the man's view-point. Both turned aside from the world: the Stoics and the mystics, such as Thompson. Both, day and night, lived their lives apart; the lust of the flesh, and lust of the eyes, and the pride of life failed to secure dominion over them. Along the radiant flow of "The Hound of Heaven" the reader's eye caught the flash of this doctrine of renunciation; he was charmed by the imagery, the wondrous power of metaphor; and the magic simile, in which the like and the likened-to so blended and so lit each other up, appealed to him; but he missed the full import of the poem. He saw the sun-starts on the surface of the poem; but he did not see the deep full rush of the waters down below. He is the scientist whose theory gives you the explanation of only a part of the facts. It explains in some way, the renunciation constraining him day and night of the first stanza; the turning from human love of the second; the rejection of nature's charms in the third; and it is on the strength of that, that Thompson is set down as some Stoic seeker after the inner light, some one who has but discovered once again the Ethic of these old pagans.

But, at once, that splendid and insistent refrain that ever sounds and resounds across the course of the poem rises to reject such a hypothesis and to refuse to fit into it. If Thompson were but proclaiming a gospel of denial, a mere asceticism, why

introduce the Hound? Why repeat the refrain at each pause, as it were, in the pursuit? Why labour so wisely and so well to convey the idea of a chase in which a quarry is being hounded down? Why but because the asceticism is less than half the story? It is an instrument, it is a means, it is a weapon, but it is handled, wielded and used by some higher power and to achieve some higher end.

The angels keep their ancient places:
Turn but a stone, and start a wing:
'Tis we, 'tis our estranged faces
That miss the many-splendoured thing.

It is because this poem does not present you with any mere attenuated theory of Ethics, any hand-to-mouth doctrine of day-by-day usefulness, but embraces in its scope the windswept "margent of the world," and thunders with its fists at the very "gateways of the stars" that such a view as that of the writer in the *Edinburgh Review* is too shallow to hold it, and leaves what is best and deepest and most original unexplained. The refrain on that Stoic view is a mere artificial and useless excrescence on the buildings: on the catholic view, it is almost the electricity, which illuminates its every inch. The visible shows of things had their call on Thompson: he loved them with the poet's love as he lingered over them with the poet's eye; but the visible things were to him a symbol, aye and far more than a symbol; for him they were as the lantern, into which he peered that he might see the light which it contained. The poet, in his own fine phrase, "saw through the lamp, Beauty, the light, God." With that light extinguished, the lamp would be to him a dark, forbidding thing that gave no brightness to the eye and no guidance to the footsteps. This idea of the omnipresence of God was to him worked into his childhood thought: it was sown as a seed, in that early mind, and it was to bloom and blossom into more splendid flower, for the fierce and glaring rays of adversity whereby it was ripened and matured. The child and the common person learns that idea and it goes into one compartment of the mind, to be retained, in truth, for reference, but to be only poorly realized in daily life; but, when

the poet and the mystic gets it, with it, he colors all his seeing, he uses it as a torch that throws light in the darkness, and he reinforces with it the dimness of daily sight. That is why in "The Hound of Heaven," we find every move of the world, every tress of nature's hair, made to be a sign as it is an action of that God "in whom," as St. Paul says, "we live and move and have our being." It is the hand of God that closes to the "little casement" of human affection, whose opening drew the poet's heart aside; it is God's angel that plucked the winsome children from him by the hair; it is God's claim on all the powers of nature that made them fall away from the poet when he would not allow them to lead him to God.

"Yea, faileth now even dream
 The dreamer, and the lute the lutanist,
 Even the linked fantasies in whose blossomy twist
 I swung the earth a trinket at my wrist,
 Are yielding; cords of all too weak account
 For earth with heavy griefs so overplussed."

That is the great idea that comes as a shock to the modern unbelieving mind; it is the spirit of the ages of Faith rising up in opposition to the corrupt and wicked generation that asks for a sign. It is a spiritual world-view over against a material world-view. It is theism, but theism not as it is compressed and withered and robbed of sap between the pages of a book, but theism as a fragrant flower in the garden of life shedding the odour of Sanctity over those who dwell therein.

We have said that the poet loved the universe, yea loved it as it is loved by little children. He loved the Dawn and the Eve, and he appealed to them, as kindred spirits; he knew "all the swift importings on the wilful face of the skies"; he knew how the young eyes of children grow "sudden fair." But none of these things could by themselves fill his hungry heart; one by one, they fell from him and left him in want and misery because he had looked to them alone.

Nature, poor stepdame, cannot slake my drouth;
 Let her, if she would owe me,
 Drop yon blue bosom-veil of sky, and show me
 The breasts o' her tenderness;
 Never did any milk of hers once bless
 My thirsting mouth.

Thompson, like all men who do not rest in mere words, but have gone down to the great ideas that are at the root of things, loves to come back to the same thoughts again and again, and to look at them from every angle. Thus the very idea of the above lines he puts into prose with great explicitness when he says in one of his essays; "O Titan nature! a pretty race, which has dwarfed its spirit in dwellings, and bounded it in selfish shallows of art, may find you too vast, may shrink from you into its earths; but though you be a very large thing, and my heart a very little thing, yet Titan as you are, my heart is too great for you. . . . Absolute Nature lives not in our life; nor yet is lifeless, but lives in the life of God; and in so far, and so far merely as man lives in that life, does he come into sympathy with Nature, and Nature with him. She is God's daughter, who stretches her hand only to her Father's friends. Not Shelley, not Wordsworth himself, ever drew so close to the heart of Nature as did the Seraph of Assisi, who was close to the heart of God." There is a void in man's spirit that Nature leaves yet empty; a void that brings the homesick wanderer home at last to God as, indeed, it is God's hand that step by step discloses to him the nothingness of Nature, His mere creature, when dependent on herself.

All which I took from thee I did but take,
 Not for thy harms,
 But just that thou might'st seek it in My arms.
 All which thy child's mistake
 Fancies as lost, I have stored for thee at home;
 Rise, clasp My hand, and come.

The greater part of the poem whirls along in a mighty rush till it reaches the stately pause of reconciliation near the close, but there is resting. That part is the measured and ever recurrent beat of the refrain. The varied whirling part puts before our eyes the kaleidoscopic rush of earthly things; all is bright, attractive, shining, but all is transitory. The unvarying portion on the other hand shows the divine Lover who is ever insistent and ever present, and of whom the poet sings:—

"With thy young skiey blossoms heap me over
 From this tremendous Lover!
 Float thy vague veil about me, lest He see!"

In this way the poem may be looked on as a parable whereby the spiritual idea is bodied forth, and definite habitation and name given to some of the most ethereal truths of philosophy. As the Good Shepherd describes God's love and tenderness for the human soul, and the Prodigal son sets forth His forgiveness to the repentant sinner, so this poem brings out His omnipresence, on the one hand, and on the other, his immediate personal care for every human soul, for every individual man, by showing the constancy wherewith the hound pursues, and his tirelessness till at last his quarry is overtaken and yields.

This idea of a hound brings out, at one bold stroke, the continued and unfaltering love of God, which never brooks repulse. The reader finds that from this idea the poet departs from time to time, but departs from it only to return to it ever very soon again. Such a vision or image cannot fit with exact coincidence all the features of God's relations to the soul, and, when that happens, the poet lays it aside for a moment. But the great idea that you cannot elude, cannot get away from God, that God will overtake you, and that whithersoever you fly from Him, there He will be before you—that idea has a fitting image and parable in the hound that turns with every turn of the quarry which it pursues. "Fear wist not to evade," says the poet "as love wist to pursue." All this has a perfectly exact parallel in perhaps the greatest of the Psalms, Psalm cxxxviii, where the Psalmist, who is telling of God's watchfulness, says:—

"Domine probasti me, et cognovisti me: tu cognovisti sessionem meam et resurrectionem meam.

Quo ibo a spiritu tuo? Et quo a facie tua fugiam?

Si sumpsero pennas meas diluculo et habitavero in extremis maris:

Etenim illuc manus tua deducet me: et tenebit me dextera tua."

As the inspired psalmist would take his wings early in the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea to escape the watching and warding God, so the Thompson tells us:

Across the margent of the world I fled,
And troubled the gold gateways of the stars,
Smiting for shelter on their clanged bars.

Of course, as the "Hound of Heaven" was written in the fullness of the Catholic spirit and inspiration, it is not surprising that it bears resemblances and striking ones to other fruits of the same genius. The same God that watched over Saint Augustine in the days of his youth and tried him so that he turned at length to the light is praised and sung in "The Hound of Heaven" and, if the soul of Saint Augustine burst forth in protest against the Pelagianism of old, so did that of Francis Thompson against the naturalism, which is rife and rampant on all sides to-day. Thus, to be concrete, for these two endings of the refrain in the poem:—

Lo! nought contents thee, who content'st not me.
And thou dravest love from thee, who dravest Me.

We have two remarkable predecessors in those two familiar sentences from the "Confessions":—

"Fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in Te."

"Nondum amabam et amare amabam: quaerebam quid amarem amans amare."

It is this splendid proclamation of the supernatural order that gives to Francis Thompson so noble a place in modern literature. He has seen into the world with deeper insight than other men. They have lived comfortably on the surface: he has sounded the depths. The universe to his faith is not dead; but the hand of God is everywhere. Every action and every atom speaks to him of the God that made them in the beginning and sustains them at every hour. We can say of him, but in a yet higher and fuller sense, what he has said of Carlyle: "In an age of the grossest materiality, no smug "Scientific" explanations could loosen his clutch on the perpetual Pentecostal miracle of Nature," for to Thompson, as to the prophets of old, all nature spoke in divers tongues the wonderful works of God. And more that he says of Carlyle is truer of himself, and particularly true of "The Hound of Heaven" for it was out of the abundance of his own heart that his mouth was praising another. Thus he goes on of Carlyle: "He saw and burningly proclaimed nature to be manifestly

wonderful and prophetic. No rationalism could shut from him the inwardness which was latent in all her outwardness: externality almost ceased for him in the miraculous light which permeated and emanated from it."

That big idea, God's omnipresence, which reaches out its arms so widely is supplemented and complemented by another which seems almost its antithesis, in one view. God is everywhere; He balances the planets in His hand; He measures the motions of the moon; He holds the Sun in its central place. Yet of every individual solitary soul is He mindful, and He regards with anxious eye the salvation of each. No individualism could emphasize more than Christianity the infinite worth of each and every human soul. God has numbered the hairs of man's head, and man has been bought at a great price. He has loved us with an everlasting love. It is of that manifold love that we catch the reflections mirrored in such parables of the New Testament as that of the Good Shepherd, and that of the Prodigal Son. All that, too, is put into "The Hound of Heaven" and makes up the background of its thought, without which it cannot be understood. So Thompson describes how, even though he be "of all man's clotted clay the dingiest clot," still God has a care for him:—

"Strange piteous futile thing!
Wherefore should any set thee love apart?
Seeing none but makes much of nought; (He said)
'And human love needs human meriting.'"

God watches always: in the busy hour of the day when we are distracted by cares and activities so that we heed not His presence: and in the dark hour of the night, when sleep has closed our eyes and sealed our mind, so that we reck not, He is there. Yet it is only in special moments of light,—be they inspirations of the mind or be they outward incidents that try us and turn our thoughts to Him—it is only in such moments as these that God makes His presence and care manifest to the individual. It is such an incident at the close of the poem that brings the great culmination, that sums it all up, that unties all the knots and solves all the doubts of its course:

Halts by me that footfall!
Is my gloom, after all,
Shade of His hand, outstretched caressingly?
"Ah, fondest, blindest, weakest,
I am He Whom thou seekest!
Thou dravest love from thee, who dravest me."¹

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¹ It is strange that through like bitter courses, and by the same pathway of suffering, another poet, to whom Francis Thompson is very much akin in life and genius, came to learn the same lesson and to leave it to us enshrined in the greatest of his poems. Fortune buffeted poor Mangan too: destiny cast him down: the world found him wanting; and, even as Francis Thompson, he tells us how at length he came to light, and of himself he says:—

And till now trampled, derided, hated,
And worn by weakness, disease, and wrong,
He fled for shelter to God, who mated,
His soul with song.

ABELARD.

Abelard, who may well be selected as representing the twelfth century in the history of philosophy, represents only one phase of the mind of that century. It was a century of immense intellectual activity, of great intellectual unrest, of conflict and adjustment, and in all these Abelard was only one force. But by his originality of character, by the picturesque tragedy of his personal history and by the ideas and the method which he advocated, he stands out from among his contemporaries as the most conspicuous, versatile and influential, if not the most commendable or admirable figure in the history of the times. He lived through the Storm and Stress period of scholasticism, in an age of "dialectical madness," as it has been styled; and of all the fighters in the arena he was the most doughty; of all the dialecticians he was the most skillful and the most daring. John the Scot stood literally alone in the ninth century, Gerbert in the tenth had few rivals and no equal as a teacher, Anselm in the eleventh century dwelt in the peace and calm of the cloister, Abelard in the twelfth century was constantly in the midst of the fray, a fighter born, who loved above all things of the mind the clash of syllogistic argumentation. He had no respect for authority, no reverence for established reputation, no regard for the traditional order. He was always in a storm center of one kind or another, so that, in order to understand his career and his fate, it is necessary to know something of the problems which interested the minds of his day and generation.

These problems were two. One was a question of method, the other a question of logic. The question of method involved the use of reason in the discussion of higher themes in philosophy and in the elucidation of the mysteries of faith. On this point two schools were already formed. The mystics decried and condemned the use of reason in the effort to grasp

spiritual truth. They despised and abhorred logic as a weapon in the warfare of the spirit or even as an instrument in the quest of higher truth. It was not by dialectic, said St. Peter Damian, that God was pleased to save His people. Dialectic, said the Victorines, is the "devil's art": it makes men proud and self-sufficient; it leads to the knowledge which, as St. Paul says, "puffeth up." It has never yet saved a soul, nor made a man better in the eyes of God. Far more profitable than logic is the humble prayer, the devout meditation and the unquestioning acceptance of truth on the authority of God and of His Church. *Credo ut intelligam*, "I believe in order that I may understand," "Faith aids Reason," was the motto of the mystic group. The rationalists, on the other hand, adopted as their motto *Intelligo ut credam*, "I understand in order that I may believe," "Reason aids faith." They had great confidence in the power of reason, in logic and argumentation and discussion. They were a product of the spirit of the times, of the new medieval mind that was strong in the freshness of its youth, that would try all things and seek a reasonable explanation of all spiritual truth. It was therefore, authority for the mystics, reason for the rationalists. It was piety and humility against skill and self-confidence. It was conservatism against progress, if you wish to put it that way, though not necessarily orthodoxy against free thought. For the age was lusty in its youthful vigor, but also inexperienced in its immaturity. There were excesses on both sides. The mystics were sometimes obscurantists, and the rationalists often overstepped the bounds of moderation and reverence. It was only a century later that, under more favorable circumstances, and under the guidance of master-minds like that of St. Thomas, these perplexing problems were solved, and the claims of authority reconciled with the legitimate demands of reason. Meantime, the twelfth century struggled with the problem and seethed with the disturbance which it engendered. Abelard, as we shall see, was with the rationalists, and, while he did much to prejudice the cause which he advocated, it was his achievements that hastened the day when men could clearly see to

distinguish between what was excessive in his claims and what was moderate and justifiable.

The other question of the day was the problem of Universals. We learned long ago in grammar to distinguish two kinds of nouns, the singular, or proper, name and the general, or universal, name. Thus, "The highest mountain in the world" is a singular name, while "Mountain" is a universal, or general, name. The question is raised in logic whether there are, besides the universal names, ideas which correspond to them, and farther, if there are universal ideas, or concepts, whether there are outside the mind, *things* which may be called universal. There are, therefore, three schools. The Nominalists maintain that the name, and the name alone, is universal. The Conceptualists hold that we have in our minds universal ideas, or concepts. The Realists contend that not only are there universal names and universal ideas but also real things outside the mind, which are truly universal. Plato was a realist of the extreme type. He taught that in the intelligible world above us there are real universal forms, or prototypes, according to which particular things in the world of our experience are fashioned. This appealed to the naïve mind of the ninth and tenth centuries. To John the Scot it recommended itself because it suited his Platonic temperament and fitted into his scheme of divine emanation. To John's contemporaries it appealed because, in their intellectual innocence, as one may call it, they took every word to stand for a reality. Thus, Fredegis of Tours gravely maintained the real substantial nature of "darkness" and "nothing," because of the Scriptural use of those terms. In Abelard's day the old realism was found unsatisfactory. Roscelin of Compiègne had arisen and declared himself an outspoken Nominalist. "Universals," he said, "are merely the breath of the voice," a word and nothing more. Abelard threw himself into the conflict with reckless ardor. He fought with equal brilliancy and skill both the Realists and the Nominalists. What his own opinion was we shall see later. Here it is sufficient to remark that a great deal of his time and his labors was devoted to the discussion

of this topic. It is easy now for the critic to find fault and call the problem of universals a useless, even a frivolous dispute. But, to the minds of men in the twelfth century it was a question of paramount importance. It was "the question of the day," as evolution was some twenty years ago or pragmatism is at present. And it was by no means unimportant. If universals are mere names, and universal ideas, if there are any such, have no foundation outside the mind, then, to take merely one consequence, the principles of conduct, since they are universal, are merely a matter of words, or an affair of the mind, without any warrant in the nature of things; and the conclusions of science, for the same reason, have no relation to the world of reality. So, at least, it seemed to those twelfth century scholastics. They took up the question fearlessly, and discussed it with very great subtlety, the only drawback to their discussion being that they did not bring psychology to bear on the problem. All the more reason why Abelard should see here the opportunity to achieve success. He was a master of dialectical reasoning, and the problem of universals gave him the chance to display his extraordinary gifts.

Such were the problems which occupied the minds of philosophers in the twelfth century. Such was the intellectual milieu in which Abelard distinguished himself. His career has been touched by romance, in which, as in a golden light, he is seen and admired and somewhat idealized. The Abelard of romance does not interest us here, but rather the philosopher, the orator, the dialectician, whose biography has come down to us in documents dating from his own day and especially in the "Story of my Misfortunes," the pathetic title which he gave to the narrative of his own life.

He was born at Pallet, near Nantes, in Brittany in the year 1079. His parents, recognizing, perhaps, his talent for fighting, intended that he should adopt the military career. He himself was early inclined rather to that of scholarship, and so, as he tells us, he "deserted Mars for Minerva," without, we may add, entirely renouncing the god of battles. He was a disciple for a while of the celebrated Nominalist Roscelin,

and frequented also the schools of other teachers of rhetoric and dialectic. He was probably a wandering scholar, travelling on foot from town to town, seeking at the monasteries a hospitality which was always freely given, or earning a meal and a bed, sometimes by such menial service as sweeping or drawing water to the horses at the inn, or sometimes by playing the lute or singing. Abelard probably sang for his board and bed. He had, he tells us himself, the most beautiful voice in all France, and his songs later on made him famous among students all over Europe. After five or six years of this kind of life—"I went wherever dialectic flourished," he says—he went for the first time to Paris where the renown of many great teachers had already made the schools famous throughout Christendom. The date must have been about 1100. At that time, by far the most renowned of the Parisian teachers was William of Champeaux, a champion of ultra-realism. To him Abelard repaired, bent, not so much on learning as on criticising. The fame of the great teacher, far from overawing the stripling from Brittany, seemed rather to make him all the more desirous of meeting the master in a dialectical encounter. They met on the question of the day, the problem of Universals. With merciless skill, Abelard exposed the weakness of realism such as his master taught, and showed by a brilliant display of erudition as well as by keen logical contention that the Universal cannot exist outside the mind as a full-fledged universal. His victory was complete. The teacher first changed his formula, then abandoned it altogether, and finally, in confusion, gave up his chair at Paris and retired to the monastery of St. Victor. Thereupon Abelard decided to open a school of his own, not at Paris, for there the followers of the defeated Master were too numerous and too resentful, but nearby at Melun and afterwards at Corbeil. After a few years spent in his native Brittany, he returned to Paris, where, first having made it very uncomfortable for William's successor, he finally secured that chair for himself, and became the best known teacher in Christendom. He was not satisfied, however, with his triumph in logic. He desired new laurels,

and theology now seemed to claim his attention. He heard of the lessons given by Anselm of Laon, a disciple of St. Anselm of Canterbury, which were attracting very great attention. He went, therefore, as a student, apparently desirous of learning, but in reality impelled once more by his restless spirit of contention. In a short time he was as openly critical of his teacher in theology as he had been of his teacher in logic. It was the same story over again, and he was not happy until he had secured a complete victory. Having secured it, as he tells us himself, he returned to Paris and began his career as a teacher at Notre-Dame. This was the most brilliant and successful period of his life. Writing many years later, he sees the cause of all his subsequent misfortunes to have been his own pride and love of pleasure. "I knew," he says, "that I was the handsomest man in France, had the sweetest voice in all Christendom, and was the greatest philosopher in all the world." He was keenly conscious of his popularity and showed a most inordinate appetite for praise. If ever a head was turned by success, his was. To this period belongs the story of his love for Heloise and the tragedies to which it led. The story as he himself tells it—and he does not spare himself—is sordid enough. It was only later, when the separation came, and those wonderful letters were written by Heloise, the classical expression, they may be called, of womanly devotion, and passionate affection, that the episode begins to have the appearance of a romance.

The events that follow, in Abelard's own account of them, are full of interest for the historian, but have little to do with Abelard as a teacher. He had been a cleric in minor orders: this, at least, is probable. He now became a monk, first at the Monastery of St. Denis, near Paris, and afterwards at St. Gildas in Brittany. It was impossible for him, even in the cloister, to moderate his passion for contention or to set bounds to his impetuous zeal. At St. Denis he made himself unbearable to the monks by his claim that the Saint, their patron, was not and could not be the Dionysius mentioned in the Acts of the Apostles. Abelard, of course, was right. But

what are we to think of his tactfulness? As Abbot of St. Gildas he was zealous beyond all measure in his effort to restore discipline, but for his pains he was driven from the monastery and was obliged to seek peace and quiet in a desert place near Troyes, where he built the monastery afterwards known as the Paraclete. There with a very few friends and disciples he first built a few rude huts of reeds and mud, intending to spend there the remainder of his days. But his popularity was so great in the world of scholarship that pupils went flocking to him from every direction, begging him to resume his lessons. "More subtle and more learned than ever," as a contemporary admirer expresses it, he repeated his successes of former days and was finally persuaded to return to Paris and reopen his school there. During this period of his activity as a teacher he seems to have devoted his attention principally to theology, and to have delighted especially in provoking the follows of Anselm of Laon by his dangerous doctrine on the Trinity. Already as early as 1121 he had been cited before the Council of Soissons. It is not easy to determine exactly what took place at that council, though it is certain that Abelard was condemned to recite the Athanasian Creed and burn his book on the Trinity. Now, a most formidable foe enters on the scene, one who is to play a decisive rôle in the rest of Abelard's career, St. Bernard of Clairvaux. It is hard at this late date, even with the abundant materials that lie before us, to judge accurately the motives and states of mind of men who, so long ago, moved in the events that make the history of that time. St. Bernard has been accused of injustice, cruelty and harshness towards Abelard. He has been called a heresy-hunter. The sincerity of his professions has been questioned. In fact, he has been made the heavy villain of a tale in which Abelard appears as the innocent victim. What we know with certainty is that St. Bernard was a great saint, a man of singular tenderness and fine spiritual feeling. We can hardly reconcile with these traits the vindictiveness, the insincerity, the coarse and heartless cynicism that have been laid to his charge. He could not fail to come into conflict with Abelard.

He was the typical mystic: his opponent was the no less typical rationalist. He was steeped, so to speak, in reverence for authority, Abelard had not the least respect for established tradition. He was austere in his personal life, while the reputation of former misdeeds, though they were long since deplored and atoned for, still clung to the daring philosopher. St. Bernard had learned in the solitude of the cloister to value prayer, contemplation and meditation and to distrust the practices and devices of the dialecticians. He was thoroughly alarmed as well as shocked personally at the daring recklessness of a teacher who did not hesitate to apply the methods of the turbulent class hall to the discussion of the most sacred mysteries of Faith. In this, at least, he was perfectly sincere. And, after all, he had, at least, a right to his view as well as Abelard had to his. If he were another dialectical knight-errant, like his opponent, and sought nothing more than a personal victory, we could hardly sympathise with his zeal, as we do when we ascertain that his motive was unselfish, that alarm for the integrity of the Faith, and fear for the future of the Church's dogma inspired him to act. And, when he was once aroused, he was a formidable foe. Abelard felt at once that in Bernard he had to deal with no ordinary man. He knew the power of the monk of Clairvaux, as the whole Christian world knew it, to be almost limitless. Bernard by his personal sanctity and by his prestige as a preacher had acquired a unique position in the Church. Bishops, Cardinals and even Popes, were his personal friends: some of them had been his disciples in the spiritual life, and with them his word was almost law. But, though he knew this, the dialectician was undaunted. He met admonition with defiance and answered denunciation by a challenge to a public debate. He knew his strength. But Bernard at the same time, knew his own limitations. He declined the challenge. Finally, it seems it was Abelard who demanded that a council of bishops be assembled to hear both sides, and, accordingly, a council was held at Sens in the year 1141.

It should be borne in mind that it was not so much the

conclusions of Abelard's theology as his method and his manner that St. Bernard objected to. There was, indeed, a question of actual heresy. Abelard had already been accused of teaching that there is no distinction between the three persons of the Blessed Trinity except a modal one: in other words, that the Three Persons are merely three modal manifestations of the one divine essence. But, in the eyes of St. Bernard, it was the extreme rationalism of Abelard that was at fault, and his total lack of respect for authority in theology. St. Bernard prepared himself for the encounter by prayer, fasting and study, and was ready, when the day came, to produce the passages from Abelard's writings to which he objected. He went to the council surrounded by his monks, who shared with him a profound distrust of rationalistic methods. Abelard summoned his followers, and up to the last moment, boasted that the discomfiture of the Cistercian would be swift and complete.

This brings us to the eve of the day set for the Council. There is extant, from the pen of a pupil of Abelard's, an extraordinary story to the effect that, the evening before the assembly met, the bishops held a very informal meeting in which, at the instigation of St. Bernard, the case was all "framed up," as we say. No critical historian nowadays takes that story for a true narrative, and even the most ardent haters of St. Bernard say that "No one who reads it will take it literally." The day of the Council arrived, the fourth of June, 1141. There were present the most distinguished ecclesiastics and theologians of the kingdom, the king himself, surrounded by his nobles, and St. Bernard with his company of white-robed monks from Clairvaux. Into the Church walked Abelard, followed by his disciples, boisterous, scornful, defiant. But, as the Master of dialectic, the hero of many a brilliant logical encounter, advanced up the nave, he came at last face to face with his accuser, and when the moment arrived for the indictment to be read, he astonished friend and foe alike by declaring: "I will not hear the Cistercian, I appeal to Rome," and turning on his heel, left the Cathedral, not indeed, a victor

in the contest, but yet a free man; for now the majesty of the Papal authority hung like a mantle around him and, pending his appeal, no action could be taken against him. The Council, thereupon, drew up the statement to be forwarded to Rome. Abelard set out, after some delay, intending to present his own case, but had proceeded only as far as Cluny when the news reached him that Rome had confirmed the decision of the council and had decided against him.

And now the last years of his checkered life were spent in the friendship of a truly great man, in conditions of ideal quiet, in a peace which he had never before sought but which he now at last appreciated. It was the venerable Peter of Cluny who threw open to the exile the gates of that grand old monastery, and extended to the broken-hearted teacher a welcome so cordial, so tender and so warmhearted that he deserves for that alone the gratitude of all who sympathise with the wayward and know that kindness such as his often reaches farther than zeal like St. Bernard's. Abelard donned the habit of the monks of Cluny, and was treated with the utmost consideration by all the brethren. Through the good offices of the Abbot a reconciliation with St. Bernard was brought about, and the forlorn philosopher began to learn from the Venerable Peter the elementary lessons of humility and simplicity. The end soon came. In the spring of 1142 he died at Chalons-sur-Saone, in the mild valley of the Seine, whither the abbot of Cluny had sent him for the benefit of his health. His remains were sent to the Paraclete, which had for many years been a nunnery over which Heloise presided as Abbess. There, in the course of time the body of Heloise was interred in the same grave, and there both remained until they were transferred in recent times to the cemetery of Père Lachaise near Paris. The last act of kindness on the part of Peter of Cluny was to write to Heloise a letter full of tender Christian charity in which he describes the last year of Abelard's life. "Not a moment passed but he was either praying or teaching or writing or composing." He is "ever to be named with honor, the servant of Christ and verily Christ's philosopher." Thus, then, the

closing scene of that life so full of vicissitudes was the most beautiful. The last days were passed among friends who could appreciate him, and a real change had come over the once turbulent spirit.

The details of Abelard's biography have detained us so long because in his case it is preëminently true that the man is the key to the philosophy. Without a knowledge of his character it is hopeless to try and understand what he taught and how he taught. He was above all things a fighter, a *vir bellator ab adolescentia*, as St. Bernard said. He was the typical militant dialectician of the twelfth century, the Don Quixote of an age of dialectic knight-errantry. And his cause was that of rationalism. His temperament was overwhelmingly logical, not distinctively spiritual. He did not know what restraint meant in matters intellectual. He had not the least shadow of reverence, but was, on the contrary, impelled by his impetuosity to "rush in" where the mystics "feared to tread." His gifts of person, of manner and of intellect were undoubtedly great. His personal magnetism, his fearlessness, his brilliant talent for argumentation, his eloquence and his vein of poetry made success easy, and success was his greatest enemy. Even his most ardent admirers cannot deny that he had an inordinate love of display. He appears to us to have preferred victory to truth, and, though the verdict is severe, we think it is justified by the study of his works and by his own account of his exploits. Nevertheless, as we shall see, he did an inestimable service to scholastic philosophy, and though he lived to see the wreck of all his cherished hopes, we can now look back through the centuries and see that it was his method, if not his ideas, that finally succeeded, in the thirteenth century.

On the question of method in philosophy and theology Abelard, as has been said, was a rationalist. He had no sympathy with the mystic view emphasized by St. Anselm; for him the *Intelligo ut credam* was the only motto. He had no knowledge of the vast Platonic and Neo-platonic world of thought in which John the Scot habitually dwelt. He seems to have

just discovered the possibilities of dialectical reasoning, and he has no idea except to put those possibilities to the test. He does not say in so many words that reason can prove all truth, but he acts on that supposition, and never hesitates or stops. Thus, in practice, he obliterates the distinction between reason and revelation, between knowledge and faith, between philosophy and theology. St. Bernard was instinctively right when he felt that this was a dangerous attitude. But, the time had not yet come for a clear, definite formulation of principles: the man who was to do that was Thomas of Aquin, and his day had not yet dawned. No one stepped out of the crowd of mystics to say that Abelard was partly right, and none of Abelard's followers was clear-sighted or candid enough to admit that he was partly wrong. We see it all very distinctly now. We see that Abelard was right in principle: reason *does* aid faith, we try to know in order to believe. But, we see too that Abelard abused the principle when he set no bounds to its use. We should, indeed, try to understand what we believe, but should we refuse to believe what we cannot fully understand? Abelard does not say positively that we *should* refuse, but he acts on that supposition. St. Bernard sums up his charges in the sentence: "The faith of the righteous believes, it does not dispute; but *that man*, as if he suspected God, has no mind to believe what his reason has not positively proved by arguments."

It is vain now to attempt a prediction of what might have happened in the past, given such and such conditions. Yet it may be instructive to point out that *if* Abelard had been of a different temperament, if he had been more moderate, more tactful, more considerate of the convictions of others, he would undoubtedly have prevailed even against men like St. Bernard. His fate was that of many another intemperate reformer, that of Roger Bacon, for example, who in the thirteenth century could have inaugurated the discoveries of the fifteenth in astronomy and physics, if it were not for just such tactlessness, just such impetuosity, just such intolerance of opposition as characterized Abelard.

On the question of Universals Abelard, as has been said, took a determined stand both against the extreme nominalism of Roscelin on the one hand and against the extreme realism of William of Champeaux on the other. We have seen how he routed the Realist from his chair and forced him to modify his doctrine. He was equally uncompromising in opposition to Roscelin, his former teacher. It was a rough age, and one that did not mince words. "It was," he says, "as I recall it, the insane opinion of my teacher Roscelin that" the universals are mere words. The "insane opinion," and "crazy doctrine," how respectful on the part of a pupil referring to his professor! While, however, this is certain that Abelard was neither a nominalist nor a realist of the exaggerated type, it is not quite clear just what his doctrine was. Perhaps we are safe in saying that he prepared the way for moderate realism. But, neither he nor any of his contemporaries could quite give a satisfactory solution so long as they studied the question from the point of view of dialectic alone. It takes psychology to solve the problem, and they had not yet reached that point. They argued the matter dialectically, that is, they took a sentence such as "Socrates is a man" and studied out the logical consequences that would follow if the universality of the predicate is merely nominal, or if the predicate stands for a real, universal human nature. There was no attempt to study *how* the mind acquires universals or how knowledge in general is built up in the mind. The strength of that age was the use it made of dialectic; the weakness of the age was that it relied on dialectic alone.

One of Abelard's best known works is the *Sic et Non*, a title which we may translate *Yea and Nay*. It consists of a number of quotations from the writings of the Fathers arranged under different heads, or questions, and showing the affirmative and the negative. Thus under the heading "Is God Omnipotent?" would be placed first the affirmative passages from ancient Christian writers and then the negative passages in which the same writers or others seem to contradict the doctrine of omnipotence. The aim of the book is not sceptical: it is not

intended to undermine the reader's faith. It is intended rather to stimulate his efforts, to furnish materials on which to exercise his dialectical skill. The work is epoch-marking, if not epoch-making. In former centuries it was considered a laudable task to give excerpts from the writings of the ancients, and many books were made up exclusively of such excerpts. Venerable Bede, Cassiodorus, Isidore of Seville, Alcuin and others wrote works in which there is hardly a sentence that is original. It was a laudable task because books were scarce and often inaccessible, and the preservation of the heritage of the past was, indeed, important. But see how times have changed! Abelard reproduces the sayings of the ancients, and at the same time pits authority against authority in order to give the student a chance to use his logic. St. Thomas will do practically the same thing in the objections which he places in front of each thesis; but he will do more. He will answer every objection, neatly, clearly, definitely, so that there will be no unexplained contradictions, no real antinomies of thought. He will show in what sense one authority affirms what the other denies, and all will lead to harmony of authority as well as to greater clearness of grasp on the part of the student. Abelard's *Yea and Nay* stands, then, midway between the early medieval compendiums which merely recapitulated, and the thirteenth century *Summae* which subjected the tradition of the past to the full force of dialectical discipline. It is the forerunner of these *Summae*, and as such is a most valuable contribution to medieval literature.

Another treatise, which even more clearly than the *Yea and Nay* shows Abelard's attitude, is his *Dialogue between a Jew, a Christian and a Philosopher*. In it, the Jew argues, of course, from the authority of the Old Testament, the Christian from the authority of the New Testament, and of the Church, and the philosopher from the light of reason alone. That one should suit one's argument to the previous convictions of one's opponent seems perfectly fair and permissible to us. In arguing with one who admits the authority neither of the New Testament nor of the Old, one may rely on reason alone. So,

too, it seemed to St. Thomas who, in his *Summa Contra Gentiles*, written for the conversion of the Saracens, adopts this very policy. Yet Abelard's contemporaries found fault with him for doing that very thing. The reason, once more, for finding fault, is not in the use but in the abuse of the principle. Abelard tries, through the character of the philosopher, to prove all truth from reason alone, not excepting even the mysteries of Faith. He even goes so far as to assert that the mystery of the Trinity was known to the philosophers of pagan times.

Other doctrines of Abelard, exhibiting a similar humanistic tendency are contained in his ethical and theological writings. In regard to the origin of the universe and the question of optimism or pessimism he held a peculiar doctrine. God, he said, is all powerful, loves what is good, and is free from jealousy. Therefore, He made the best possible world, for to say that He refrained from creating anything that was good, or stinted, so to speak, the amount of good that He put in the world, is to accuse him of jealousy or of downright malice. Is it not curious to find this optimism of conviction triumphing over all the personal experiences of the man? Abelard's life was a tragedy long drawn out. His personal opinion of it is contained in the title of his autobiography, *The Story of My Misfortunes*. At one time, indeed, he was so embittered that he cried out: "I had rather seek happiness among the Turks than among those who call themselves Christians." And, yet, such is the force of logic, he rises above his personal impressions and, on abstract principles, maintains that this world is the best possible world. His attitude towards the pagan philosophy of the past was one of more than mere tolerance. The moral precepts of the Christian law, he said, are merely applications of a natural moral law, that was known to the philosophers of Greece and Rome. This sentiment gave offense at the time. The age was not yet ripe for a sympathetic study of pagan antiquity. There still hung over the Christian world the shadow of the days when Christian writers denounced the morals of their pagan contemporaries as thoroughly corrupt.

A century after Abelard's time, the moral treatises of Aristotle were known and studied in Christian Europe and a different view began to prevail. The shortcomings of pagan standards of conduct were acknowledged then, as always. But, the conviction grew that the wisest of the pagans discovered many moral truths which underlie the divine law of Christianity, that there is a natural law, written "in the fleshy tablets of the heart," which no human being can ignore, and by which conduct was directed before Christ's revelation was made. Abelard did not see this in the same light as St. Thomas did. His understanding of it was partial or onesided; his expressions were immature and inexact.

Shall we, then, throw the blame on fate and say that Abelard was born before his time? Shall we excuse his errors and condone his offenses by shifting the responsibility to that destiny which shapes the course of human history? It is undeniable that Abelard had a large and influential following among the most thoughtful as well as among the most daring of his contemporaries. Otto of Freising, John of Salisbury, Arnold of Brescia and Berenger of Poitiers were not the only ones influenced by him. The Great Peter, called the Lombard, author of the *Books of Sentences*, was his disciple. Pope Celestine II was also a disciple of his. And there can be no doubt that in the final struggle between rationalism and mysticism, it was the rationalistic tendency that triumphed, and its triumph is largely due to the methods which Abelard perfected. In the scholasticism of St. Thomas of Aquin there is mysticism as well as rationalism; but the rationalistic tendency predominates, and it is, in principle, the rationalism for which Abelard fought and suffered. In principle, but not in the detailed application. We cannot, then, overlook the faults into which Abelard fell. No matter in what age he lived, he would have come into conflict with the official Church. He set no bounds, apparently to the use of Dialectic. He recognized no limits to the use of reason in matters of faith. That would have been condemned in any century as well as in the twelfth. It seems, indeed, to be the fate

of many innovators that, while they themselves suffer and are condemned, their ideas ultimately triumph and are accepted. It is easy to grow sentimental over the ingratitude of the world to those to whom it owes most. But is it not more becoming in the critic to find a reason for this state of affairs? And, without generalizing too much, may not the reason in many cases be the personal faults of the innovator and his lack of moderation? It was so in Roger Bacon's case, and it seems to be so in the case of Abelard. His jaunty, defiant, flippant air of all-preparedness, with which he ventured into the lists against men of established reputation and teachers of world-wide renown is picturesque and, at long range, not unpleasing. The colossal vanity of the man, especially when it is a matter merely of good looks and musical voice, is also an element of attractiveness, the more so, that he confesses it so naïvely and so honestly. But behind these traits there was a pride and self-sufficiency that is nothing short of disgusting. Let me give an example of that pride. When he found peace at last in the cloister of Cluny and in the open heart of the Venerable Peter discovered a haven of rest, he became humble and docile, that is to say, as humble and docile as was possible for one of his nature. It was then that he wrote his confession of faith. In that confession he says "Everything, however well said, may be perverted. I myself, though I have composed but a few treatises, and those of small extent, have not been able to escape censure; though, in truth, in the things on account of which I have been violently attacked, I can (as God knows) see no fault whatsoever on my part; and if any such fault be discovered, I have no disposition to defend it obstinately. I have, perhaps, by mistake, written many things not after the right manner: but I call God to witness that in the things for which I am accused, I have maintained nothing out of an evil will or out of pride." This, I think, is a very singular confession. In it, the purpose of amendment is struggling hard with the old temperamental pride. How different was the case of St. Augustine, who, when he had to acknowledge his errors did so in a simple, straightforward, utterly candid manner.

And thus we take leave of this complex personality that had so profound an influence on medieval thought. Not in harshness, for while we point to his personal shortcomings and lay to his own faults the blame for his lack of success, we cannot refuse to pay him the tribute of our sympathy. In his case the saying may be reversed: The good which he did lived after him, the evil was interred with his bones. The good prevailed in the philosophy of the century that came after his, and the evil ended in the tragedy of his own life. The Abelard of the popular imagination is identified with neither one nor the other, neither with the evil that he did nor with the good that he accomplished. The romantic figure of the devoted lover, very different from the historic personage of the philosopher, lives on and will live on as long as there are poets and lovers in the world. The songs in which he celebrated the charms of Heloise are now, unfortunately, lost beyond anything but the mere possibility of recovery. There remain, however, the remarkable series of letters which passed between these lovers of so long ago. In them piety and passion, sense and sentiment, idealism and realism are mingled in true medieval fashion. The Abelard who wrote those letters and lived out the life-tragedy which they depict so graphically, would, had he never been a philosopher or a theologian, have lived for ever in popular literature and in the imagination of posterity.

WILLIAM TURNER.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Thoughts of a Catholic Anatomist. By Thomas Dwight, M. D., LL. D., Parkman Professor of Anatomy at Harvard. New York, 1911. Longmans, vii + 243 pp.

It is no disparagement of the services rendered to the cause of religion by the pens of our theologians and philosophers to say that, today, a piece of apologetic, however simple, embodying a belief in the supernatural, when it comes from anyone of acknowledged rank in the scientific world—that is, in the world of the physical sciences—is likely to exert more influence to unbelievers than the ablest systematic treatise from a professional defender of the faith. The Church is opposed to Science—with a capital! No Scientist can, now-a-days, believe in the supernatural. This commonplace has become axiomatic in the market-place as well as in the lecture-hall. No dialectic refutation of this calumny has half the convincing impact of one instance of a man who is at once an eminent scientist and a sincere Catholic. Such a man was the late Professor Dwight of Harvard University. The testimony that his life bore to truth was all the more forcible because the science in which he was a master belonged to the biological group, which to a greater extent even than that of the “brown stones” has been tortured to bear witness against the existence of the Creator. The influence which Dr. Dwight had over his students and his associates, by the mere fact that he was at once a scientist and a believer can scarcely be overstated. And the loss sustained by the Church in America through his death is correspondingly great. Happily, however, being dead, he yet speaketh in the pages of an admirable little book which survives him the modesty of whose title is characteristic of its author. It was composed, he informs the reader, for the purpose of showing those outside the Church, and, if need be, poorly instructed Catholics within, “how a Catholic can be a man of science, and conversely how a man of science can be a Catholic.”

The gist of the book is to answer in the negative the question, Has the evolution theory disproved the existence of a personal God?

After glancing at the extent to which doubt of the supernatural has invaded the modern atmosphere, the author briefly states the argument from causation as sufficient to prove the existence of God; then proceeds to dispose of the contention that religion is merely a matter of emotion; and afterwards points out that to acknowledge an intelligent Creator involves the acknowledgment of design in the universe. With this truth, evolution in a modified form is, he shows, quite compatible. But, he contends, no adequate scientific evidence is produced to prove the contention that there has been a gradual transition from the non-living to life; nor, furthermore, do any of the various theories proposed to explain the ascent of man from the brute, offer any plausible line of development from the lower forms to the human body. The language is remarkably free from scientific terminology, except where that is indispensable; and the author preserves a tone of kindly good temper and moderation in his discussion. If he becomes severe it is only when he comments on the exaggerations of "the *sans-culottes* of science," or the unblushing arrogance of those who adopt Weissman's line of argument to establish a faulty hypothesis: "It is inconceivable that there should yet be another capable of explaining the adaptation of organisms, *without assuming the help of a principle of design.*"

JAMES J. FOX.

Sermons and Lectures. By Monsignor Grosch, Rector of St. John the Evangelist, Islington, London. New York, Benzigers. vii + 394 pp.

The friends of Monsignor Grosch, who overcame his reluctance to putting into print this collection of sermons and lectures, were rightly inspired. There is not one of the discourses that does not deserve to be preserved in permanent form. They are seventeen in number. Four treat of religion with practical aspects. Three are upon the Church; the others treat of other doctrinal points, or are historical. The thought is simple, direct and forcible, the exposition clear and terse, in plain appropriate language—the right type of parochial sermon.

JAMES J. FOX.

The Supreme Problem. An Examination of Historical Christianity from the standpoint of human life and experience and in the light of psychical phenomena. By J. Godfrey Raupert. New York, Benzigers, xx + 324.

In his introduction to this, in some respects novel, contribution to the apologetic library, after glancing at the prevalence of doubt about religious truths in the world, and the inability of science to solve or even contribute any valuable evidence towards the solution of the Great Enigma, the author indicates the scope of his book. It is to show that the two great fundamental dogmas of the Catholic Church, which alone offer any final answer to the great question; the Fall of Man and the Restoration and Redemption through Jesus Christ, are approved by the experiences of life. As one reads this proposal the thought of Newman's great pages towards the end of the *Apologia* occur to the mind; and we are not surprised to find them quoted before we have proceeded very far in the first chapter. In fact this thought of Newman's is the dominant and unifying element of the entire book. It is well to keep this in mind as we follow Mr. Raupert through his argument; for, when discussing the Fall and the existence of the devil, he comes face to face with spiritism and the group of psychic phenomena related to that subject, he dilates very extensively indeed on his favorite subject. Upon it he has nothing to say that will be new to those who have read his other works that deal *ex professo* with it. Although this defense of Catholic fundamental doctrine treats the arguments—apart from the particular one just mentioned—in a rather trite fashion, yet, because it is really as it claims to be “a human document,” it may prove more convincing to some minds than would one of more systematic character.

JAMES J. FOX.

Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics. Edited by James Hastings, M. A., D. D., and others. Vol. iv, Confirmation-Drama. New York, Scribners, 1912. Pp. xvi + 907.

This important work continues to maintain the standard of first class scholarship which it exhibited in the first three volumes.

"Religion" and "Ethics" are, of course, broad terms, and the title of the work permits the introduction of many articles which to some may seem but remotely connected with the practice and theory of religion or the science of human conduct. "Cross-roads," "Crystal-gazing," "Cuchulainn Cycle," "Dew," and many other topics, however interesting in themselves, and however interestingly treated, as they are in this volume, would be more appropriately included in a general cyclopedia, or in a cyclopedia of anthropology or folk-lore than in one which bears the title of the volume before us. This volume, so far as we have observed, is not objectionable in its treatment of Catholic topics. There is, however, running through the work a note of naturalism, which, while it does not render the *Encyclopedia* unsuitable as a work of reference for scholars, is enough to make it dangerous in the hands of those who are lacking in theological training.

WILLIAM TURNER.

The Rule of St. Clare. By Paschal Robinson, of the Order of Friars Minor. Philadelphia, The Dolphin Press, 1912. Pp. 32.

An attractively printed pamphlet on the Rule of St. Clare and its observance, in the light of early documents, has just come from the Dolphin Press. All who are interested in early Franciscan literature, knowing the competence of Father Paschal in everything relating to St. Clare, will welcome this latest fruit of his diligent research. The *Bulletin* will publish in the June number an equally interesting study by the same author, entitled "The Personality of Saint Clare."

WILLIAM TURNER.

Studies. An Irish Theological Quarterly Review of Letters, Philosophy and Science. Vol. I, No. 1, March, 1912. Pp. 220.

This is the first number of a Quarterly Review conducted by some University Professors and Graduates of the National University of Ireland. It will appear in the months of March, June, September and December, and is under the editorial management

of a committee whose chairman is Rev. T. A. Fenlay, S. J., Professor of Political Economy, University College, Dublin. It will publish original Articles, Notes, Bulletins of recent publications and Book Reviews. The field to which it appeals ought to be a wide one: Modern Literature, Celtic, Classics and Oriental Literatures, History, Philosophy, Sociology, Education and Sciences are the branches which will be specially provided for in its issues. The spirit of the publication is indicated in the "Foreword" in which are read "The principles of treatment in these subjects (Philosophy, Sociology and Education) and in cognate branches will be based on the traditional philosophy of the Christian world, which has even in recent years, shown itself far superior to any of its temporary rivals in organizing the proved results of modern research, and in initiating the solution of pressing problems in the speculative, social and scientific field." The *Bulletin* wishes the new Irish Quarterly many years of usefulness and success.

WILLIAM TURNER.

The Mustard Seed, An Argument on Behalf of the Divinity of Christ. By O. R. Vassall-Phillips, of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer. New York, Benziger Bros, 1912. Pp. xxxii + 530.

The Mustard Seed is a valuable contribution to the literature of Catholic Apologetics. Popular, practical, direct, yet thoroughly sound in method, it will prove a useful aid to the priest or layman who is desirous of explaining our position, and, placed in the hands of a non-Catholic, should not fail to produce a profound impression. The volume has a Preface by Father Hugh Benson and an Epilogue by Mr. Hilaire Beloe.

WILLIAM TURNER.

Gadelica: a Journal of Modern-Irish Studies, Vol. I, No. 1.

The first number of a new quarterly with the above title, published by Hodges, Figgis & Co. for the Association of Modern-Irish Studies, under the editorship of Thomas F. Rahilly, appeared in March. This journal, in the words of the prefatory note, aims

"to do for Modern Irish what has been, and is being, done so successfully for the older forms of the language by such periodicals as *Erin*, the *Zeitschrift für Celtische Philologie*, and the *Revue Celtique*." It proposes to publish Modern Irish texts from mss., both prose and verse, original articles and studies dealing with the Modern Irish language (from about 1600 to the present day), or with its literature, folk-songs, folk-tales, and the like. The need has long been felt for such a medium for the publication of a vast literature which has hitherto been hidden away in manuscript form in the stacks of Irish and other libraries. That this literature can with truth be called 'vast' is evident from the estimate made by O'Curry, that the manuscripts contained in the library of the Royal Irish Academy alone would, if published, fill a thousand volumes. The importance of the throwing open of such a treasury to the historian, the student of literature, the lexicographer and the philologist need not be pointed out.

The first number contains the opening articles of several series: one on the Life and Works of Owen O'Keefe, a poet-priest of the early eighteenth century, by Tadhg O'Donoghue; another on a prose satire on the upstart aristocracy and unlettered peasants of the middle of the seventeenth century, called the "Parliament of the Children of Thomas," by Professor Osborn Bergin; a third presenting the diary of Humphrey O'Sullivan of Callan, Kilkenny, of the year 1827. Other articles are entitled: Mid-Eighteenth Century Conversation, by J. H. Loyd; a Poem by Bonaventure O'Hussey, O. S. F., being a farewell to Ireland on leaving it for the continent, by Miss Eleanor Knott; a "Vision" dealing with the Repeal Movement, by Father Dinneen; an Elegy on the Death of Tadhg "Gaedhealach" O'Sullivan, a favorite Gaelic poet of the sixteenth century, by James Cassidy. There are also some interesting lexicographical notes on certain Gaelic words and expressions, and a review of a new edition of Bishop Gallagher's Irish sermons (*Maynooth Sermons*, Vol. iv.)

The contributors to "Gadelica" are well-known Irish scholars, and to judge by the opening number, this journal bids fair to accomplish its aim. The field it has marked out for itself has up to this time been barely touched, and thus it serves to round out the circle of Gaelic studies. It deserves success as filling a long-felt want; the beginning it has made augurs well for that success. The interest already aroused in the Gaelic Revival assures us that

the efforts of the promoters of its latest exponent will meet with the support they well merit.

JAMES A. GEARY.

Le Missel Romain. Ses Origines, son histoire. Par Dom J. Bandot, O. S. B. 1 vol. in-16 de la Collection *Science et Religion* (Série Liturgie, no. 631-632). Bloud et Cie. Paris, 1912. Pp. 128.

While it would not be reasonable to expect that the entire process by which the Roman Missal has reached its present form could be described in such small compass, and while the materials for a complete work on that subject are not yet available, it is nevertheless an advantage to have the main lines of such an undertaking clearly laid down. As a work for the general reader and even for advanced students of Liturgy this pamphlet offers many features of excellence. One point in particular cannot be overlooked. The Mass is the centre of the Liturgical life of the Church, and in studying the formation of the Missal we have a clue leading through the entire range of liturgical activity in the past. This brochure forms one of a large series dealing with liturgical subjects which have come from the pen of Dom Bandot, and which are published under the general editorship of his learned colleague Dom Cabrol.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Enchiridion Patristicum. Locos SS. Patrum, Doctorum, Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum in usum Scholarum collegit M. J. Rouët de Journal, S. J. Herder. Freiburg, 1911. 8vo. Pp. xxiv + 887.

Three useful manuals uniform in scope and size are now available for Catholic students of the theological sciences—the present work, Denziger's *Enchiridion Symbolorum et Definitionum* and Kirch's *Enchiridium Fontium Historiae Ecclesiasticae*. This compilation is intended to obviate unnecessary labor in constructing the "traditionis quod vocant argumentum," and to present the principal Patristic texts on which that argument is based. It goes without

saying that the choice of documents will not meet with universal approval; but no better method could have been devised for the purpose than that which is described by the author in his Introduction. Some characteristics are worthy of note. No texts are taken from authors later than St. John Damascene. A Latin translation accompanies all Greek texts. In some cases the extracts are printed in extenso, in others merely a few lines are given. A series of cross references and four separate Indices make it easy to control and utilize all the material. While it was undesirable that some, in fact many, texts which are found in Kirch should be reprinted here, the aim and purpose of the two works are so different that repetition does not deprive either of its usefulness or distinctive character. The author wisely warns his readers that such a compilation does not dispense students from a more detailed study of Patristic writings. As a matter of fact the full usefulness of the compilation will be apparent only to those who have made such studies.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

La Loi et La Foi. Etude sur St. Paul et les Judaïsants. Par A. de Boysson, Directeur au Séminaire de Saint Sulpice. Paris. Bloud et Cie., 1912. 12mo. Pp. viii + 339.

A question of prime importance in the days of the apostles was that regarding the "vocation of the Gentiles." St. Paul insisted that the faith should not be restricted to those within the law, and triumphed over his "Judaizing" opponents. The history of this controversy, and an exposition of the teaching of St. Paul on the subject form the subject of this work. Two important results have been obtained by M. de Boysson in this erudite study. In the first place he has dealt successfully with a difficult matter of exegesis and history, and in the second place by accurately recounting what the conflict against the "Judaizers" was in reality, he has done much to clear up the hazy and erroneous views which still survive in some quarters as a result of the widespread circulation of the Pauline and Petrean theories of the Tübingen writers. The work is expository and constructive, and though the opportunity presented itself, the author has wisely refrained from unnecessary polemics.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

La Séparation des Églises et de l'État. Par J. de Narfon. Felix Alcan. Paris, 1912. Pp. iv + 317.

The views of M. de Narfon on the separation of Church and State in France are too well-known to need any comment. In this book he has simply collected and summarized a number of articles which appeared in various publications, *La Grande Revue*, *Figaro*, *France Catholique*, etc. In his discussion of the causes which led to the separation and of the manner in which it was accomplished, M. de Narfon shows himself a warm defender of the French Government and an equally hostile critic of the ecclesiastical authorities. After reading his account of the results of the separation it is hard to find the reasons on which he bases his hope that the French church will ultimately emerge from the conflict with greater strength, unity, and influence.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

The Credibility of the Gospel. ("Orpheus" et l'Évangile). By Monseigneur Pierre Batiffol. Translated by Rev. G. C. H. Pollen, S. J. Longmans, Green and Co. London and New York. 1912. 8vo. Pp. xx + 220.

The burden of the attacks on Christianity nowadays may be summed up as Christianity without Christ. Various philosophies, evolutionary, monistic, materialistic, idealistic, or combinations of these systems seek a formula to explain all historical occurrences, and incidentally to account for the existence of the Christian religion without postulating for it a supernatural origin. This is no easy task. As time goes on the difficulties seem to increase rather than to diminish. A great mass of traditional belief surrounds the central facts in the Christian religion. This belief entered into the consciousness of the church, though the proofs on which it rested were frequently lost sight of. Under the stress of conflict the vanished proofs and reasons are reappearing. The manner of their reappearance forms the special merit of such works as this of Batiffol. It may be asserted without exaggeration that, from whatever point Christianity is attacked today, the purpose underlying the attack is the same, viz., to show that at heart

the religion of the Gospel contains nothing which may not be looked on as a product of purely natural forces, and that these forces operate independently of any Providential intervention. The credibility of the Gospel is a general reply to such assaults. Special emphasis, however, is laid throughout the book on points connected with the position taken by Solomon Reinach in his work *Orpheus*, regarding the origin and early history of Christianity. The work, which appeared in 1909, was immediately translated into many other languages, but because it attracted no special attention in the English speaking world, the translator entitled Batiffol's work, "The Credibility of the Gospel" rather than call it by its French title, 'Orpheus et l'Évangile.' One result of the publication of Reinach's work was the searching analysis of his theory of the origin of religion and other theories allied to it, to which it led. The central thesis of *Orpheus* was explicit enough; but judging by the numerous detailed criticisms of the work which followed, it is hardly too much to say that it contained few accurate statements of fact, and no correct interpretations. Irrespective of Reinach's abortive offering, Batiffol's work is admirably suited to present needs. The great mass of humanity know practically nothing of the intense struggle which is being constantly carried on among students of the New Testament and early Christian history. Statements bearing the authority of a great name filter down to the minds of those who have no capacity to judge of their value, most frequently after they have been discarded in scientific circles, and often weaken, if they do not destroy, faith. It was for the needs of such people that these lectures were written and to meet the demands of a time "when error is forcing its way into all stages of public teaching and when even Catholic consciences though not darkened, may still be moved by a vague apprehension, often more to be feared than any definite objections."

As it stands Batiffol's work contains the substance of eight lectures delivered at Versailles in a Course of Higher Religious Instruction instituted by some of the leading Catholics of that place. Without technicalities, and without appealing to feeling or prejudice, the main thesis of the work is consistently expounded and defended. The Gospel of history is the gospel of tradition; the Christ of the Church is the Christ of the Gospel and of history. The method pursued is not new. Because of the wealth of new material which is introduced, however, and because of the manner

in which the results of the labors of other workers, Catholic and non-Catholic, are laid under contribution, each chapter has a special point and significance. There are eight of these chapters. The silence of Flavius Josephus; Rabbis and Romans; The Catholic Canon; Saint Paul; The Author of the Acts; The Gospels; The Authenticity of the Discourses of Jesus; The Historic Certainty of the Gospel Story. What the plan and purpose of the book are, is clearly shown by these titles. The first two chapters deal with the evidence for the historic truth of the Gospels found in non-Christian sources: the other with the evidence of the inspired Word in New Testament documents. Or stated differently the author assumes the burden of finding an answer to the question:—What are the critical proofs of the general history of Our Lord? The apologetic and polemical value of such a work can hardly be overestimated. Though the limits imposed on the author did not allow him to give more than a mere outline or bare skeleton of the historical argument for the Credibility of the Gospels, he nevertheless brings together the essentials and expresses them in a way fully within the comprehension of the least technically minded. The fact that the statements of Solomon Reinach were kept in view in the composition of this work does not detract from its general value and utility. In establishing the fact that the traditional view of the Gospel and its contents is the correct one against an author who finds the source of all religion in “*un ensemble de scrupules, c'est-à-dire de tabous*,” a result is attained, which is equally valid against monism—idealistic or materialistic—and equally opposed to the views of such men as Paul Drews or Simon Patton.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Commentaire Français Littéral de la Somme Théologique de S.

Th. d'Aquin. Par R. P. Thomas Pègues, O. P. T. VI, Toulouse, 1911 (Ed. Privat, 14 Rue des Arts).

The five preceding volumes of this valuable work completed Fr. Pègues' translation and commentary on the First Part (Ia Pars) of the Summa (see *Catholic University Bulletin*, Jan., 1908, Jan., 1909, Apr., 1910, Mar., 1911). The sixth volume deals with the first twenty-one Questions of the *Prima-Secundae*, containing the treatise on the *End of Man* and on *Human Acts*, by which man

attains to his end or deviates from it. These titles show how important and fundamental are the subjects dealt with. Man's eternal destiny is in his own hands: it is determined by his own deliberate acts. To the consideration of these acts St. Thomas devotes 108 Questions of the Ia 2ae (on Human Acts *in genere*) and 189 Questions of the 2a 2ae (on Human Acts *in specie*). Positive laws, civil or ecclesiastical, may change: the fundamental principles of morality, so accurately and so luminously expounded by the Angelic Doctor in the Second Part of his Summa, are immutable. In no other portion of his writings, remarks Fr. Pègues (Introd. to Q. vi), does the genius of St. Thomas appear "more powerful, more original, more analytic and synthetic." The first twenty-one Questions of the Second Part contain the quintessence and the necessary foundation of all Moral Theology. Nothing to surpass, and most probably nothing to equal, St. Thomas' treatise on these fundamental questions, has been written by the hand of man. For a perfect specimen of observant and rational psychology readers are referred to his analysis and classification of the acts of the human mind and will. Faithful to the plan announced in the first volume Fr. Pègues continues to give a literal translation, which is remarkably clear and concise, together with a commentary neither too long nor too short—just enough to elucidate the text and to show its bearing on important questions. Commenting on the fifth and sixth articles of the nineteenth Question, where St. Thomas lays down the principle, that the morality of a man's acts depends on his conscience, *i. e.*, on the judgment of the reason pronouncing the act good or bad, the translator introduces the question of Probabilism, which he answers in the sense of a Probabiliorist. His solution will not be accepted by all; some of his own brethren will dissent; but his arguments must receive consideration, especially when he shows that, according to St. Thomas, the will can not be right when it decides to act against the judgment of the mind. Whilst this is true, one might well say: The judgment of my mind is that I am free when the reasons are evenly balanced on the side of liberty and in favor of the law. The writer of these lines is one amongst many to whom it seems impossible, as Fr. Pègues justly remarks, to form a final judgment in favor of liberty when the stronger (more probable) reasons are on the side of the law.

MISCELLANEOUS.

A Bibliography of Pragmatism.¹

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¹This tentative bibliography of pragmatism (humanism) was prepared by a member of the 1911-12 philosophy seminar given by Doctors Pace and Turner at this University. Some of the articles are included only because they were occasionally referred to in the exegetical and polemic literature of pragmatism, or for reference to popularized expositions. On the other hand articles, such as the greater number of Professor Dewey's, have been omitted as they deal with problems foreign to pragmatism, albeit treated from a pragmatic standpoint.

The compiler takes this opportunity to express the thanks of the students of the philosophy seminar of 1911-12 to Doctor Edward Pace and Doctor William Turner for their kind instruction during the seminar, and his thanks to Doctor Turner and Mr. Joseph Schneider, Librarians of the Catholic University, for their assistance in the preparation of this paper.

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NOXON TOOMEY.

An Irish Homily on the Holy Eucharist: Text and Translation.

The present Homily is perhaps the most creditable of those here published from the Rennes ms. It is clearly divided into three parts, developing in turn the reality of the change of the bread and wine into the Body and Blood of Christ, the necessity of cleansing the conscience from sin as a preparation for Holy Communion, and the obligation of keeping oneself free from sin subsequently. This doctrine, the practising of which is the corner-stone of Catholic morality, is in the main effectively presented.

In the first part we do not find a detailed account of the philosophical side of Transubstantiation, as might be expected if the author drew on Saint Thomas or other scholastics of his age. There is no direct reference to the Angelic Doctor. Though the quotations from "the Author" may be from him, they may with equal probability be from another, as the expressions quoted are commonplaces of Catholic thought. We can draw no conclusions, therefore, as to the probable date of the composition. Some of the expressions used are hazardous or at least inaccurate. For instance, we find in the second paragraph (of the translation) the expression that Christ could "change His own Body into bread and wine for us," and again, "Christ formed His own Body and Blood in bread and wine." This is clearly a slip on the part of the author, for the true statement of the change of bread and wine into the Body and Blood of Christ is found in the same paragraph, and even in the opening paragraph. The author might perhaps be charged with holding the heretical doctrine known as "companionation," that is, the doctrine that the bread and wine continue to exist after the consecration, but that the Body and Blood of Christ are really present along with them. The opening sentence lends color to this view. But we cannot be certain that by "bread and wine" he did not mean simply the appearances of bread and wine, for he does not mention the distinction between substance and accident, nor discuss in detail the doctrine of

Transubstantiation. We are not in a position, therefore, to say just what he did mean. We can say, however, that there is a strange alternation of exact and inexact statements of the mystery.

The first paragraph appears to be incomplete or garbled. The sentence containing the quotation "Verbum caro factum est" should naturally give a translation of the Latin words. Only a slight play of imagination is necessary in order to see in what follows immediately a distorted rendering of the quotation. It appears to me that it was originally a translation, and that there has been omitted a sentence or two in which was shown the connection between the dogmas of the Incarnation and the Holy Eucharist. As it stands, the sentence makes no sense whatever.

No fault can be found with the presentation of the remaining points of the Homily on the ground of doctrine. The usual parallels are drawn between various miracles of the Old and New Testaments and this, the most wonderful of the works of God, to show its possibility and to draw practical conclusions as to the proper preparation for Communion. The most striking point is the frequency with which the Old Testament is quoted, a point, however, in which this Homily does not differ greatly from the others. Certainly the author does not appear to have neglected the reading of the Bible, though he lived before the Reformation. We must admit, however, that he is guilty in many cases of serious inaccuracies both in expressing his own thoughts and in his quotations from others. Several references to books of the Old Testament are manifestly mistakes. Job, especially, is quoted for passages which may perhaps come from Saint Gregory's *De Moralibus*, which is a commentary on that book.

It remains to be noted that there are two authorities quoted in the present Homily who have not been identified. They are referred to as *Elariensis* and *Nenuensis*. Their identification may throw some light on the literary relations of Ireland with the continent in the Middle Ages.

TEXT.

(Fo 29b, l. 18) Do chorp Crist and so óir atat tri ní ré-tuiesin ann. an céd ní dib .i. creidem a-substaint cuirp Crist do-beith an-aran 7 a-fín in-tan adeir an-sacart na-briatra so hoc est corpus meus¹ 7 cetera .i. is é so mo-corp-sa fein 7 intaigi ant-aran an-tan sin a-corp Christ 7 an-fín an-a-fuil 7 do subachus na-bretri sin an-tan adeir sé Verbum caro factum est 7 habitabit in-nobis 7 cetera 7 doniter corp dia-di an-tan sin 7 indtaighi indaindi 7 na-h-ergett lucht an-t-seacrain ar-umnugadh a-timcill-na-bretri so oir do bí cach uile ní ullamh mar-is-luaithe adubairt sé he.

Óir do-rindi carracc tsalaind do-mnaí loich an a eisimplair so tri tuillemh feirgi día in-tan-tuc an dighaltus ar soduma 7 argomorra 7 do claeclaigh sé slat móisi a colibar .i. a-nathair nemi 7 do claeclaigh mar an cedna topair 7 srotha na h-egipti a-fuil 7 a-n-uisceda a-neim 7 re guidi elias mar an cedna tuc sé tene do-neim do indeachadh ar-na-dæinib Mas-eadh cad hé ant-adbar nach claechlochadh sé a-corp fein an-arán 7 a-fín duinne oir is mó na-cumachta ní do cruthugadh can-adbar na-adbar do cruthugadh a-ní ele óir do cruthuigh Crist corp adaim can-adbar 7 do aisie spiratt lasarais ar-mor-grad a-cuirp a-talmain 7 ní-mothuigtech resúnta do cruthugadh do-n-talmain mítuicsi mírésunta. Mas-eadh creittid co-fétann Crist a-corp fein do denam do-n aran 7 a-fuil do-n-fín. Oir do ní duine an-æn-ló amain iarann do-n-talmain 7 glaine do-n lúaithe. Mas-eadh creidigh o-sa-mó cumachta día na cumachta an-duine co-fétann a-corp fein do denam d-áran mar adbar 7 a-fuil do-fín 7 cidhed adubradar na-heritici cindus do creitfimis do corp Crist 7 nach-faicmit hé 7 do-fregar elariensis iad 7 do fiarfaidh an-faicidi na-bethadhaigh cruthuigter i-sin-talmain o cumachtaib día co-h-aimserda nemfollas díb-si 7 o atait mar sin cret do-bir oraínd can-a-creidem cur cruthuigh Crist a-corp 7 a-fuil fein an-arán 7 a-fín óir ní leir día 7 a-cumachta acht tri-sgathán a-diachta 7 do fiarfaidh ant-eritice cindus marus corp Crist an-cach-æn aimsir óir da-ma-commór re slíab hé do caithfidhe hé fada búadha 7 is-í a eisimplair sin .i. gur sás Crist na V míle do dæinib le V aranaib 7 le da iasc 7 cur mó a-fuighill na iatt fein ar-tus 7 is mar sin fétus día an-eclais do-sasadh d-a-corp fein. Oir fétaidh dellramh na-greine 7 tes na-teined 7 baladh an-rósa 7 ecna an duine tarba

¹ Sic, ms.

TRANSLATION.

Of the body of Christ here: for there are three things to understand in it. The first of them, namely, to believe that the substance of the Body of Christ is in [the] bread and wine when the priest says these words, "*Hoc est corpus meum, et cetera*," that is, "This is my own Body." And the bread changes at that time into the Body of Christ, and the wine into His Blood. And by virtue¹ of these words, when he says, "*Verbum caro factum est et habitavit in nobis, et cetera*," it is made the Body of God at that time and changes into us. And let not those who are in error arise contending about these words; for everything was finished as soon as He said it.

For He made a rock of salt of Lot's wife as an example of this, through deserving the anger of God when He brought vengeance on Sodom and Gomorrha. And He changed the rod of Moses into a serpent, namely, into a viper. And in the same way He changed the wells and streams of Egypt into blood, and their waters into poison. And through the prayer of Elias in the same way He sent fire from heaven through displeasure at the people. What therefore is the reason that He would not change His own Body into bread and wine for us? For it is [a manifestation of] greater power to form a thing without matter than to form matter into another thing; for Christ formed the body of Adam without matter, and brought back the spirit of Lazarus for His great love of his body on earth, and [consider that it was] a sentient reasonable thing He formed from the earth which has no understanding nor reason. Therefore believe that Christ can make His own Body of the bread, and His Blood of the wine. For a man makes iron of the earth in one single day, and glass of ashes. Therefore believe, since the powers of God are greater than the powers of man, that He can make His own Body of bread as material, and His Blood of wine. And yet the heretics said:—"How could we believe in the Body of Christ when we do not see it?" And Elariensis answered them, and asked them:—"Do you see the animals that are formed in the earth by the power of God in their own times, unknown to you? And as they are so, what prevents

¹Text has "joy," which can hardly be correct.

do-denam can-digbail doib fein 7 fetaidh an-en-coindill morán coinnill do lasad cin díghbail di fein curab-amlaid sin fétus an-eclais corp Crist do comæin can-digbail 7 mar fétus an eclais .i. an seanmontaidhi an-uimir eistes a-seanmoir do-sásad can-digbail d-a-ecna is mar sin fétus an eclais corp Crist do comæinechadh da cach æn duine can-digbail do-n corp acht cid do rindetar lucht an-mícreidim amarus ar corp Crist do beith imlán i-sin (fo 29d) ablaind mbice 7 do fregair ant-údar dóib 7 adubairt corp Christ do beith co-h-implán an cach æn-rand do-n ablaind can-digbail 7 tuic a-eisimplair so i-sin [s]pecláir an-tan fechair dealb aisti co-faictir hí co-h-implán 7 da-roindter an-specláir a-rannaib imda ní lughaidi do-cíter an-delb in cach-rand di can digbail do-n deilb 7 is mar sin nach lugaidi corp Crist a-roind a-rannaib imda oir caithter an-corp-sa an-cach inad 7 mairid sé an æn-inad 7 cid caithter o-dæinib nemglana hé mairid sé co-glan 7 cid fada o do-rindidh hé mairidh co-núa 7 cid b-é gabus co-mídingmala hé is cintach hé a-fuil 7 a-feoil Crist do-reir na-canona coiserca oir cidh b-é cendcas lietauaire uasal fechtar an suigtech an-a-cuirfer hé an-glan hé no an-nemglan nó an-slán hé no an-easlán 7 is-mar sin dlighes an-[n]ech gabus sacramint cuirp Christ cuigi amail adeir ant-apstol an-duine d-a-derbadh fein an-tan gebus ant-sacramint so cuigi oir is docraidh do-n tsacart dol do caithem a-chodach corpda can-a-lama da glanad. Mas-eadh is ro-deacra dol do gabail na-sacraminti spiratalta can-an-cogubus do-glanad. Oir adubairt an-salm do comtidlaic día grasa dam fa indracus mo craidhi 7 fa-glaine oibrigti mo-lam Óir is mór do-na-dæinib bis ac-ullmughad an bíd corparda o-maidin co-ró an tres uair do ló 7 curab ar-ecin do-b-ail leó anamain leth-uair ac-a-n-ullmugadh do cum an-bíd spiratalta. oir scribtar modh ullmuigti an-cined dænna i-sin dara caibidil X an-exodus do chum gabala na-sacraminnti spiratalta can an-tuan casda do-gabail amh acht a-gabail ar-n-a-róstad a-tene grada dia Mas-eadh (fo 30a) bith a-fis acat curab amh caithitt na-dæine nach fadoghann gradh dia an-a-craidhib ant-sacramint so .i. lucht graduigti an tsægail 7 curab-ar na-róstad co-glan o-tenidh gabann an-lucht congmun césad Crist an-a-craidedaib hé óir lasann a-tenid gradha día ma[d]-duthtrachtach a-toil óir mar gabtar lactuca ar-a-seirbi do leighes na-n-eslainti corpda is-amlaid sin gabtar corp Crist maille re toirrsi craidhi ac-cuimningadh césta Crist do leighes na-pecach 7 adeir lebar na hecna co curtar manna re-tes na-greine d-a-tirmugadh 7 nach curtar do-cum na-tene hé ar ecla a-cruaduigti gurab-amlaid sin

us from believing that Christ formed His own Body and Blood in bread and in wine?" For God and His powers do not appear except by the reflection of His divinity.

And the heretic asked:—"How does the Body of Christ live in every age, for if it were as large as a mountain, it would be consumed long ago?" And this is the explanation of that, namely, that Christ satisfied five thousand people with five loaves and two fishes, and that the remnants were greater than they themselves at first. And it is thus that God can satisfy the Church with His own Body. For the radiance of the sun, and the heat of fire and the perfume of the rose, and the wisdom of man can produce fruit without diminution of themselves; and one candle can light many candles without diminishing itself. So that thus the Church can receive in communion the Body of Christ without diminution. And as the Church, that is, the preacher, can satisfy the number who listen to his sermon without diminishing his wisdom, so it is the Church can communicate the Body of Christ to everyone without diminution of the Body.

Yet unbelievers have doubted that the Body of Christ is entire in a little host. And the Author answered them and said that the Body of Christ is entire in every portion of the host, undiminished. And understand the exemplar of this in the mirror. When you look at an image in it, it is seen entire; and if the mirror is divided into many parts the image is seen no less in each part of it without diminution of the image. And so the Body of Christ is not less in one of many parts. For this Body is received in every place and it remains in one place. And although it is received by impure persons, it remains pure; and though it be long since it was made [present in the host], it remains new.

And whosoever partakes of it unworthily is guilty of the Blood and of the Body of Christ, according to the Blessed Canon.² For whosoever purchases a precious remedy considers the condition in which he is placed, whether he is clean or unclean, or whether he is healthy or unhealthy. And thus the one who partakes of the sacrament of the Body of Christ should do, as the Apostle says³ that a man should prove himself when he receives this sacrament. For it is unseemly for the priest [of the old law] to go to partake of bodily food without cleansing his hands. Therefore it is very

² That is, the Scripture. *I Cor. xi, 27.*

³ *I Cor. xi, 28.*

samlaigter corp Crist re manna a-figar a-gabala oir an-tan gabus duine corp Crist cuiridh re tes na-greine hé .i. re grad dia d-a daingniugadh in-a craidhi indus nach-scailter hé o-na-gradaib examla ele Oir scríbtar a-candicorum co-ndubairt an fáid o-tá m-anam ar-n-a-daingniugadh a-ngrad día curab inill cach uile ní dam óir an-tan gabtar corp Christ maille re-tes na-tined .i. re saint an tsagail cruadaighi sé 7 loiseter an craidhi in-a-teitt sé maille re damnad an-digaltais. Mas-eadh derbad an duine hé fein a-tirmach na greine .i. i-sa-deirc an-tan gabus hé 7 seachnad teas na-tene .i. an tsaint óir is-a-h-eisleine glain is-ingabta an corp so .i. a-sroll mar ar-cuiredh hé do reir fidhrach an-aimsir a-césta gurab amlaid sin dlíges an cristaidhi an corp so do gabail sa sroll glan .i. sa-craidhi nach fuil peacach a-cosmailes an-adlaici an-ar-cuired corp Crist nar cuiredh neach riam roine. Mas-eadh na cuired nech ar bith corp Crist san-inad as nach scrístar an-diabal óir ní bí comprait etara oir mar do braithedh Crist do-na-h-iubalaib le poice iudais is mar sin braithitt lucht (fo 30b) gabala cuirp Christ co-mídingmala do-n díabal hé an-tan cuiritt a-cend cumacht an-diabail hé .i. sa corp pecach amail adubairt Crist lá na mandala .i. atá lámh mo braithiti maille rium ar-an mbord so 7 Adeir Augustin curab mó pecaigitt na-dæine do-bir corp Christ do-na-pecachaibh .i. ballaibh an-diabail anaid na-dæine do thídlaic hé d-a-crochadh do-na-h-iubalaib curab aire sin nach fétann neach andlígéd do denam d-a-tigerna ní-is-mó na-a-cur sa prísún is cumga 7 is-sailechi do-geba amail atat lucht gabala cuirp Christ co-mídingmala 7 adeir Corentios i-sin IX caibidil X curab cintach a-fuil 7 a-feoil Christ lucht a-caithme co-mídingmala oir do-beiritt pían dó mar fuair an céd lá 7 adeir ambrosius cid b-é gabus hé co-mídingmala curab-inann dó hé 7 a-césad oir dligit na-dæine a-n-ullmugadh ar cind cuirp Christ 7 d-a-eis óir cid b-é do cuirfed brentus 7 salchar a-comraid coimetta cuirp Christ do bo eisindraic do hé curab aire sin is-eisindraic an-nech gabus corp Christ maille re droch-smúained craidhi 7 re droch-briatraib beil 7 re droch-oibrigtib cuirp

Adeir Prouerbia i-sin VII caibidil XX an-nech coimétus a tigerna do geba anoir a tigerna 7 is-docraid do-n nech diúltus a tigerna fa ædaigecht 7 is docraidhi na-sin do nech a-tarraing amach d-eis a-leicti astech 7 adeir maigistir na-riagla curab docraidhi nech re-tarraing amach d-eis a-leicti astech na-re congmail amuich ar-tus oir is-ann do-berar tarcaisne ar-an-tigerna an-tan gabtar

grievous to go to receive the spiritual sacrament without cleansing the conscience. For the Psalm ⁴ said:—"God has rendered to me according to the uprightness of my heart and according to the purity of the work of my hands." For there are many people who are preparing food for the body from morning till it is the third hour of the day, and who are hardly willing to remain a half-hour preparing themselves for the spiritual food. For there is written in the twelfth chapter of Exodus ⁵ the manner of preparing the human race for receiving the spiritual sacrament, namely, not to eat the paschal lamb raw, but to partake of it roasted by the fire of the love of God. Know, therefore, that they partake of this sacrament raw who do not kindle the love of God in their hearts, those, namely, who love the world; and that those receive it roasted completely by fire who keep the crucifixion of Christ in their hearts. For they are inflamed with the fire of the love of God if their will is earnest; for as chicory, although bitter, is taken to cure bodily ailments, so the Body of Christ is received along with sorrow of the heart, through remembrance of the crucifixion of Christ, to heal sins.

And the Book of Wisdom says ⁶ that manna is put in the heat of the sun to dry, and that is it not put to the fire for fear of hardening it; hence the Body of Christ is like to manna in the way in which we partake of it. For when one receives the Body of Christ, he puts it in the warmth of the sun, namely, in the love of God, to strengthen it in his heart, so that he may not be divided by the other diverse loves. For it is written in the Canticle of Canticles ⁷ that the prophet said:—"Since my soul has been strengthened in the love of God, everything is secure to me." For when the Body of Christ is received with the heat of fire, that is, with coveting of the world, it hardens, and the heart into which it goes is burned, with the condemnation of vengeance. Therefore let a man prove himself in the drying of the sun, namely, in charity, when he receives it, and let him avoid the heat of fire, namely covetousness. For it is in a clean shroud that this Body is to be received, namely, in linen, as He was buried according to testimony ⁸ at the time of His crucifixion. So that it is thus

⁴ *Ps.* xvii, 21 (Vulgate).

⁵ *Ex.* xii, 9.

⁶ *Wisdom*, xvi, 27 (?)

⁷ I have not found the passage in the book mentioned nor in any other.

⁸ *Matt.* xxvii, 59. This shows that *scroll* means sometimes 'linen,' but it is rare in that sense.

neach is-mesa na hé n-a-inad 7 diúltar eisin amail is-follus a-ndiúltad 7 a-ngabail Christ Oir adeir ant-udarras cur-ferr can-slidi na-fírinde do aithne na-a-treicen d-eis a-h-aithne Oir adubairt ant-udarras gur (fo 30c) ab mó do-maith do-ní mead día do-na-sodumachaibh lá na-breithi na-do-n droing do creitt dó 7 do diúlt hé 7 adeir eoin soscélaidhe sa céd caibidil co-tanice an-mac an-a-persain dilis 7 nar-gabadar a-muintear fein *cuca* he 7 is cosmail an-muinter so re iúdás noch do chaith biad ar-bord an-tigerna 7 do braith d-a-naimdib hé 7 adeir *ecclesiastic* i-sin VI caibidil *combítt* caraitt 7 companaig ar-an-mbord in aimsir ant-tsólais 7 nach-cuimnigitt beith amlaid an-aimsir na h-eicne 7 is cosmail an-drong so ris na-h-iubalaibh do imchur an-pailm co-h-anorach domnach na pailme do *cum* Christ 7 tar-a-eisi sin do chuireadar co-h-asanorach as-an-tempul amach hé 7 do braithettar do chum a-césta hé corab-amlaid sin is mór in asanoir an-tigerna do-leicen *astech* co-n-anoir 7 a-brath dí-a-naimdib fa-deoigh dí-a césadh 7 is amlaid sin do-n lucht gabus corp Christ a-fidar i-sin-eclais 7 do-bir a-namaitt an-a-cend sa-corp *cedna* .i. in diabal. Oir adeir *nenuensis* curab ingnad do-n-anam dænna nach-feoghaighenn sé an-tan dicuires a-fer pósta .i. Crist 7 gabus *cerrmach* 7 adaltrach in-a-inad .i. an-diabal. Oir adubairt eoin sa VI caibidil co-ndubairt Crist tanac chucaib a dæine an-ainm m-athar 7 nir-gababar chucaibh mé 7 tainic an-diabal an-a-ainm fein 7 do-gababar hé ac-denam an-pecaidh ar a furalam Oir cid b-é gabus corp Crist co-dingmala cuigi 7 coimétus hé do-geba an-flathamnus neamda 7 cid b-é gabus co-midingmala hé 7 nach coimetann co-duthrachtach do-geba ifirnn

FINIT AMEN

the Christian should receive this Body, namely, in clean linen, that is in a heart which is not sinful, in the likeness of the tomb in which was placed the Body of Christ, in which no one had ever before been placed. Therefore let no one put the Body of Christ in a place from which the devil has not been banished. For there is no association between them; for as Christ was betrayed to the Jews with the kiss of Judas, so those who receive the Body of Christ unworthily betray Him to the devil, since they put Him in the power of the devil, that is in the sinful body, as Christ said the day of the Mandatum:—"The hand of my betrayal is with me at this table." And Augustine says that they sin more who give the Body of Christ to sinners, that is, to the members of the devil, than those who delivered Him to the Jews to be crucified. One cannot therefore do a greater injustice to His Lord than to put Him in the narrowest and filthiest prison he finds, namely, those who receive the Body of Christ unworthily. And Corinthians says in the nineteenth⁹ chapter that those who receive Him unworthily are guilty of the Blood and the Body of Christ, for they cause Him suffering such as He received the first day. And Ambrose says that whosoever receives Him unworthily, it is the same for him as to crucify Him. For people ought to prepare themselves before the Body of Christ and after it. For whoever would associate rottenness and filth with the keeping of the Body of Christ, it would be wrongful for him. So that he is unrighteous who receives the Body of Christ with evil thoughts of the heart, and with evil words of the lips, and with evil deeds of the body.

Proverbs says in the twenty-seventh chapter:—¹⁰ "He who keepeth his Lord shall receive the honor of his Lord." And it is a grievous thing for him who refuses to entertain his Lord, and it is still more grievous for him who draws out after being let in. And the Master of Rules¹¹ says that it is more grievous that one should draw out after being admitted than remain out at first. For it is by this that contempt is shown to the Lord, when one worse than He is received in His place and He is refused, as is evident in the denial and reception of Christ. For the Authority¹²

⁹ *Recte* 'eleventh'; *I Cor.* XI, 27. *Aonmad* has been taken for *naomad* in the text.

¹⁰ *Prov.* XXVII, 18.

¹¹ *Magister Sententiarum* (?)

¹² *Cf. Luke* IX, 62; XII, 48; *Eccles.* V, 4.

says that it is better not to know the way of truth than to abandon it after knowing it. For the Authority¹³ said that the scales of God are more favorable to the men of Sodom on the day of judgment than to those who have believed in Him and denied Him. And John the Evangelist says in the first chapter¹⁴ that the Son came in His own person, and that His own people did not receive Him; and this people is like Judas who ate food at the Lord's table and betrayed Him to His enemies. And Ecclesiasticus says in the sixth chapter¹⁵ that there are friends and companions at one's table in the time of good fortune, and that they do not remember that they are friends in the time of need. And this sort of people are like the Jews who bore palms as a mark of honor on Palm Sunday to meet Christ, and after that put Him contumeliously out of the temple, and betrayed Him to be crucified. Therefore is it a great dishonor to admit the Lord with honor and finally to betray Him to His enemies to be crucified. And it is thus with those who receive the Body of Christ for appearance in the Church, and bring His enemy the devil, against Him in the same body. For Nenuensis says that it is a wonder that the human soul does not wither when she banishes her spouse, that is, Christ, and receives a gamester and an adulterer in His place, namely, the devil. For John said in the sixth chapter¹⁶ that Christ said:—"I came to you, O men, in the name of my Father, and you did not receive me; and the devil came in his own name, and you received him, committing sin at his bidding." For whosoever receives the Body of Christ worthily and keeps Him, will obtain heaven, and whosoever receives Him unworthily and does not keep him faithfully, will merit hell. FINIT. AMEN.

NOTES ON THE LANGUAGE OF THE HOMILIES.

The following paragraphs give some of the characteristics of the spelling employed in these treatises, loosely grouped as Homilies, and summarize the verb-forms, without any attempt at completeness. The forms found in the Homily on the Passion published with translation by Rev. George W. Hoey in the *Bulletin* of May and June of last year, have been included. References

¹³ *Matt.* x, 15; xi, 22, 24.

¹⁵ *V.* 10.

¹⁴ *V.* 11.

¹⁶ *Cf.* vv. 36, 38; but rather *V.* 43.

are to folio, column and line of the MS. (The discovery of the words will be aided if it is borne in mind that there are about forty lines in each column). The vocabulary does not pretend to be complete, but to give only the rarer words, and those showing some peculiarity of form or meaning.

The spelling of these Homilies is fairly consistent when compared with that of other Middle Irish texts. Aspiration, however, is not consistently marked, and there is frequent confusion of *d* and *g*, and of *m* and *b*, when aspirated. This gives us four different forms for the genitive singular and nominative-accusative plural of *pecadh*, 'sin,'—*pecaid*, *pecaidh*, *pecaig*, and *pecaigh*. Similarly *m* is frequently put for *b*, especially in compounds, with aspiration unmarked. Examples appear in the vocabulary. As regards the digraphs, we may note that *a* is sometimes written for *ai*; but on the whole there is little difference between the spelling of these Homilies and the modern spelling, except that *i* is always written for *io*, and frequently *e* for *ea* and *ei*. With this reservation, the rule of "*Caol le caol agus leathan le leathan*," is fairly well observed. When *e* stands for *ei*, we generally find an *e* or an *i* inserted after the consonant which follows. Thus the termination *-each* and *-eadh* are usually distinguished from *-ach* and *-adh* by the insertion of an *e* or an *i*. Some examples of a distinctly modern spelling are the following: *fiarfaidh*, *peacach*, *feoghaighenn*, *fírindeach*, *bochtaineachta breitheamnais*, *maitheam*. The indifferent use of *t*, *tt*, and *d* is found in the third person plural of verbs, mentioned below, and elsewhere. Similarly *c*, *cc*, and *g* are found where Modern Irish has *g*. The combination *gc*, final, is found in *fergc*, and *leisgc*, (fo 36d, 9 and 19 respectively). Eclipsis is usually indicated in words beginning with vowels, *b* and *d*, and occasionally, *f*. The metathesis of consonants, especially of *c* and *l*, is frequent, as in *fuaslacadh* (31a, 12) beside *fuascladh* (31a, 14); *oslaicedh* (31b, 10) *oslacadh* (31c, 12), and *oslaicter* (31c, 11), beside *oscail* (35a, 28). *Espaloid* (37d, 17), shows this common phenomenon in a loan-word. *Ecailsi* (36b, 3), beside the regular *eclaisi*; *coisrica* (33c, 36), beside *coiserca* (29d, 16; 32d, 27), show a somewhat similar transposition of a liquid.

The verb-forms agree rather closely with the modern paradigms, with some survivals of older forms. In the present indicative, the first person singular in *-im*, *-aim*, is very frequent. The second person, ending in *-ir*, occurs perhaps once, in *fechair*, (29d, 5); but per-

haps this should be read as a passive form *fechar* or *fechtar*. There seems to be a rare instance of the old ending in -i in *faici*, (33a, 27). In the third person are found the short forms *tic*, (*ticc*), *ric*, *tét*, (*teitt*), *do-ni*, *adeir*, and *do-beir* (more frequently *do-bir*); and also the long forms, like *beirid*, *mairid*, (*-idh*). In the two forms *cruadaighi* and *intaighi*, *-dh* has not been written. In the first person plural we find *dligmit* and *dlighomitt* side by side. The various spellings of the termination of the second person are shown by *faicidi*, *fetaidhi*, *teighti*, and *ataithi*. The third person has most frequently *-itt*, with *-at*, *-it*, (*-ait*), *-att*, and *-id* next in order of frequency. In the passive, *-ar* is found in *do-berar*, *abarar*, *aderar* and *dlegar*, (and possibly *fechar*). Elsewhere *-tar* and *-ter* are found. The relative form ends in *-us*, (mostly abbreviated), but also in *-as*, *-es*, and *-is*. The habitual form in *-ann* and *-enn* is frequent, but is not found in the so-called irregular verbs. The following appear to be present subjunctive forms: *nó co ndenaim*, *gen co mbim*, *nó co n-ícair*, *acht co n-indisir*, *da coimlinair*, *da cuimnidi*[*dh*] and the passive *indus nach scaílter*, showing the same endings as the indicative for the three persons of the singular number.

In the imperfect we have *-ad* or *-ed* as the termination of the 3rd s., except in *bíd* and *níd*, which represent the modern forms *bíodh* and *gníodh*. In the 1st pl. *leanmais* occurs, and in the 3rd pl. *tairrngidis*. The forms *fétaind*, (1st. s.), *tucta*, and *cuimnightea*, (2nd s.), and *dendais*, (3rd pl.), are probably subjunctive, but the endings agree with those of the indicative. In the passive voice, out of fourteen examples, eleven end in *-i*, as *ardaighi*, and three in *-e*, as *cruindidhe*. But seven have *t* or *th* inserted, as *tinoilthi*, and three of these have a long ending in *-idi*, *-ide*, or *-idhi*, as *curtaidi*, *estide*, *derntaidhi*.

In the preterite, besides forms like *adubart*, *tanac*, *derna*, the endings of the first singular are *-us* and *-es* (*-eas*). For the 2nd s., we have *-is* and *-ais*. The plural has *-mar*, *-bar*, and *-dar*, (*-tar*, *-ttar*). In the third person, nineteen cases out of twenty-six show *-dar*, and six cases *-tar*. In the verb *do-gním*, we find 1st s., *rindes* and *ronus*; 3rd s., *rindi*, *rinde*, *roine* and *roinne*; 3rd pl., *rindetar*. The passive voice has *-edh* and *-adh*, the aspiration being indicated in the majority of cases. The verb *do-gním* has the form *ronad* in the passive.

In the future, besides *ader* and *do-bér*, *bett* and *cuimneochat* are

found in the first person singular. In the 2nd s., *do-gebair* is found, all the rest having *-fir*, *-fair*, except denominatives like *fiarfócair* and *cuimneochair*. In the 3rd s., we have *do-geba*, *béraidh* and *goidfidhi*. The 3rd pl. appears in *do-gebatt*, *tiucfatt*, and *teisteochait*. The passive occurs twice, in *slaineocar* and *cuirfer*.

In the conditional the ending of the first person singular is *-find* or *-faind*. In the 2nd s., we have *coimetfa* and *dlighfedhtea*. The 3rd s. ends in *-fadh*, *-fedh*, except when the preceding vowel is lengthened, where it ends in *-adh* (*-ad*). In the 1st pl. we find *creitfimis* and *bemaís*. The passive has *-fidhe* *-faidhti*, once each, and twice *-thaidhi* after vowel-lengthening.

The following forms of the copula and verbum existentiae are found: Pres. Indic., 1st s., *ataim*, *ní fuilim*; 3rd s., *atá*, *má tá*, *ní* (*nach*, *ar-a*, etc.) *fuil*, *muna bfuil*, *gurab* (*curab*), *cid-b*, *ler-b*, *le-n-a-b*, *in-a-b*, *ní* (*nach*) *bí*, *ní bía*, (once only); *mad*, *mas masa*, *ó-sa*; 2nd pl., *ataithi*; 3rd pl., *atat* (four times), *atait* (twice), *ó tát*, *nach* (*co*) *fuilitt*, *co mbitt*. Relative form, *bías*, *bís*. Present Subjunctive, 3rd s., *na-rab*, *muna-rab*, *da-rab*, *co-ró* (?), *co mbía*, *da mbía*; *co-ma* and *da-ma* may be either pres. subj. or conditional. Imperfect, 3rd s., *roibi*, *roibe*, *raibi*, *bíd*. Preterite, 3rd s., *bí*; 3rd pl., *batar*. Future, 1st s., *bett*. Conditional, 3rd s., *be[i]th*, *do bo*, *do-b*, *do bod*, *ní* (*mar*) *bud*, *ní budh*; 1st pl. *bemaís*. No passive (autonomous) forms appear in this text.

INDEX VERBORUM RARIORUM.

- aigéit, 32a, 7, *vinegar*; g. s. *aigéte*, 33b, 17.
ainmfesacha, 37c, 27, = *ainbhfesacha*, *ignorant*.
aithfirindaib, 37c, 32, = *aifirindaib*, *Masses*.
an, 33a, 26 *to repeat* *da*(?),—*da cuimnidi*[dh] *sé césad Christ*
7 *an faici* . . . *riut*; or = O. Ir. *an*, *when*, *while* (?).
anmaind, 37c, 30, = *anbhfainn*, *weak*.
anmfandugad, 32b, 27, = *anbhfandugad*, *weakening*.
anmuain, 31a, 4, = *anbhuain*, *for anbhuaine*, *anxiety*, *solicitude*.
anaid, 30b, 7, = *ioná*, *than*.
anas, 34b, 32, = *ioná*, *than*.
baindi, 33a, 13, *stream*, *spurt* (of blood), Mod. Ir. *buinne*.
beus, 36c, 12, *further*.
broitti, 31a, 18, *for broidhdi*, *captives*.

- cair, 37a, 26, *fault, ein*;—do na hocht cairib collaidhi (?)
 cataerib, 37a, 6, *for cathaisib (caithrisib), vigils.*
 cerrmach, 30c, 21, = cearrbhach, *a professional gambler.*
 colibar, 29b, 33, *a serpent, L. coluber.*
 co-ró, 29d, 31, *for co-robh, till it is (?)*.
 cosaidech, 36c, 1, = casaoideach, *complaining.*
 cosaird, 36a, 4, *openly, publicly, (= co-ós-árd?)*
 deimbrig, 35a, 2, = dímbrih, *weakness.*
 deiscribidech, 35d, 6, *discreet.*
 deiscribidi, 35d, 6,—is í is deiscribidi di, *discretion consists in this*; 31d, 9, deiscribidi ana spiradaib, *discernment of spirits*; 31d, 12, a sáirsi deiscribidi, *freely according to discretion.*
 deisdingtio, 35b, 30, testinctione, 35b, 32, L. distinctio.
 derlaitech, 31d, 13, *beneficent, bounteous, free.*
 domblas aóí, 32a, 8, d. æi, 33b, 17, *gall.*
 druith, 37a, 12, *lustful.*
 eritice, 29c, 22, pl. -i, 29b, 14, *a heretic.*
 espalóid, 37d, 17, *for apsalóid, L. absolutio.*
 fæisidi, reg. gen; but dat. 36c, 8, and acc. 36c, 16. The usual dat. and acc. form is fæisidin.
 fidar, 30c, 17, *appearance, show*; fidair, 33c, 37, *type, figure*; figar, 32a, 24, fidar, 32a, 25, *image*; figar, 30a, 13, *manner.*
 fídrach, 30a, 29, cf. fíodradh, *written testimony, (O'R), (the Gospel).*
 foibred, 32c, 16, pret. pass. of fóbairim, *attack, assail.*
 fuidir, 36a, 25, *gain, profit, advantage, (O'R).*
 grasa, 29d, 28; 35a, 38; b, 21, *reward.*
 ímnugadh, 29b, 27, *contending.*
 inaitt, 37b, 37, inait, 37a, 21, = ná, *nor; elsewhere always na.*
 inellus, 33d, 33, *security, safety.*
 inill, 30a, 19, *secure.*
 insealmus, 33c, 31, *perh. for Anselmus (?)*
 lactuca, 30a, 7, *chicory, Late L. lactucella (Du Cange).*
 leth-fiadni, 37c, 6, *false witness.*
 a leth re dia, 37b, 5, *on the side of God, as pertains to God.*
 lictauaire, 29d, 17; 33c, 12, *remedy, L. electuarium.*
 mád, 35c, 1, 36a, 32, = má-s.
 maindechtaidhi, 37b, 20, 36c, 21, *negligence.*
 masa, 36a, 4, = má-s.

mas-seadh, *freq.* for *ma-s-eadh*, which also occurs.

mead, 30c, 1, dat. meidh, 32a, 22, *scales, weighing*.

medhaighecht, 30d, 27, *measurement, weight*.

co mídingmala, usually *unworthily*, but in 37c, 12; d, 2, *infrequently, inconstantly*.

na, always for ioná, *than*, except *anaid* and *anas* (once each).

na, always for ná, *nor*, except *inait* and *inaitt* (once each).

neimfní, 34a, 21, = neimhní, *nothing*.

righed, 33a, 34, *lacerating, crucifixion*.

ruaimred, 33c, 22, pret. pass. of ruamharaim, *dig, pierce*.

seilegar, 33b, 19, *spittle*.

seirgi, 34d, 1, *charity, hospitality*, (abstr. from séireach).

simind, 36b, 23, 25, *a rush, reed*.

slanícid[e], 32c, 33, *Savior*.

snimchi, 37a, 28, *grief*.

sroll, 30a, 28, 31, *linen*, (L. *byssus*, Ir. Gl. 577).

subachus, 29b, 24, possibly to be read subaclius, for subailceas, (*in the sense of subailchi, power, virtue?*)

subailchi, 31d, 6,—grasa na subailchi, *lege slanaighti(?)*, *graces of healing*.

suibiscelaidhe, 33b, 29, *Evangelist*.

teagais, 34c, 37, *mansion, habitation*.

teigim, 37c, 36, *I warm, cherish, foster*.

toícti, 34c, 35, for toicthi, or toicci, *wealth*.

uarbarta, (urbarta?), 33d, 25, 26, cf. airbert, (Kuno Meyer, *Contrib.*) *dwelling*.

JAMES A. GEARY.

CORRIGENDA.

P. 178, l. 10, for *mar-tanaig*, read *martanaig*.

P. 182, l. 6, for *adeirthisidhi*, read *aderthaidhi*.

P. 182, ll. 27, 29, 34, for *cathraig*, read *cathair*.

P. 270, l. 37, for *gebann*, read *geba*.

P. 272, l. 1, for *nderntadhi*, read *nderntaidhi*.

P. 270, l. 35, for *meic*, read *muintire*, and delete the note.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Visiting Committee. The Visiting Committee consisting of Cardinal Farley, Archbishop Glennon of St. Louis, Bishop Harkins of Providence, Mr. Walter George Smith of Philadelphia and the Rector of the University, have completed their annual visit and prepared the questions to be discussed at the Meeting of the Board of Trustees, April 17.

Forthcoming Publication. Professor Joseph Dunn, Professor of Celtic languages and literatures, is preparing for publication a translation of the famous Irish Epic, the "Cooley Cattle Raid" (*Tain Bo Cualgne*). This is the longest and the most original composition of the Old-Irish epic cycle and probably the oldest epic tale of Western Europe. In spite of the interest which it possesses on this account and in spite of its importance in the study of comparative literature it has not yet received nearly so much attention as has been given to other primitive poems, the Norse sagas, for example. Dr. Dunn aims at giving a thoroughly reliable translation for the benefit of scholars who are not able to make use of the Old-Irish original.

Lecture on Pragmatism. On Saturday, April 20, Rev. Dr. Turner, Professor of the History of Philosophy, lectured to the students of the Sacred Heart Academy, Manhattanville, New York, on "Pragmatism, the Newest Philosophy."

Knights of Columbus. Preparations have already been begun at the University to entertain the visiting Knights of Columbus who are expected in Washington, June 8, for the ceremony of unveiling the statue of Christopher Columbus. The latest official report states that of the \$500,000 to be collected for the "Knights of Columbus Endowment Fund"

\$400,000 has already been received. The full amount will be collected, it is hoped, by October of this year and will then be invested for the benefit of the University.

Meeting of the Board of Trustees. The Board of Trustees at their semi-annual meeting held April 17 approved the plan submitted to them by the University for the voluntary affiliation of Catholic High Schools and Colleges throughout the country. They also approved the completion of Gibbons Hall at a total estimated cost of \$240,000. The entire Hall will be ready for occupancy by October 1.

Shahan Debating Society. One of the most interesting meetings of the year was held by the Shahan Debating Society on Thursday evening, April 18th. There was a large number present to hear the debate which was:—*Resolved:* That Governor Harmon of Ohio is better fitted to accept the presidential nomination than Champ Clark. The large attendance was due no doubt to the superior powers of the debaters, Mr. William C. Walsh, of Cumberland, Md., for the affirmative and Mr. Robert Silk, of Memphis, Tenn., for the negative. From the arguments presented by the speakers it was apparent that their papers had been carefully prepared. The members present decided by vote of twenty-six to twenty-four that Governor Harmon was the better fitted to accept the nomination. Mr. John Russell of Waterbury, Conn., spoke in favor of Champ Clark's candidacy. A challenge was read and accepted from the Leo XIII Lyceum to a joint debate to take place about the first of May. Dr. Paul Gleis, professor of German, was present at the meeting and gave the members an interesting talk on the benefits of modern language. Dr. Hemelt, associate professor of English, spoke at length on "Constructive criticism." Mr. Daniel Cronin of Glens Falls, N. Y., gave the critic's report and at the close of the meeting Rev. J. L. Tierney, representing the Rector of the University, commended the society for the work that had been done during the past year.

Freshmen Dance. A very delightful dancing party was given by the Freshman Class of the Catholic University at Washington, D. C., on the evening of Wednesday, April 17, in the University Auditorium. The affair was one of the prettiest of its kind ever given by the University students, and great credit is due the Class of 1915 for the successful promotion of their first College event. The hall was tastily decorated under the able supervision of Wm. J. Ryan, Dover, N. J., Chairman of the Decorating Committee, and presented a charming appearance. The walls were adorned with college pennants of every color, the beams and lights were draped with the class colors of green and white, and this with the many flowers and palms added a distinctive color scheme to the huge hall which was typically collegian. Over 60 couples participated in the event, which takes front rank in the social functions held during the year in the University life of Washington.

Among the Patronesses were: Mrs. P. J. Lennox, Mrs. A. E. Landry, Mrs. F. K. Merriman, Mrs. C. H. McCarthy, Mrs. C. F. Borden, and Mrs. Vincent L. Toomey. The guests included in their number: Rt. Rev. Thomas J. Shahan, Rector of the University, Rev. Dr. George A. Dougherty, Vice-Rector, Rev. Dr. John Spensley, Rev. Fr. Tierney, Mr. C. F. Borden, Registrar, and Dr. Carrigan, Dean of the Law School.

Lectures on the Peace Movement. A course of lectures entitled "The Constructive Peace Movement," based upon the Pontifical letter of June 11, 1911, of His Holiness Pope Pius X, addressed to the Apostolic Delegate to the United States, His Eminence Cardinal Falconio, was begun April 23rd, 1912, at 4.30 p. m., in McMahon Hall.

The lectures specially prepared for this occasion will be delivered by the Honorable James Brown Scott, Technical Delegate of the United States to the Second Hague Peace Conference, Counsel of the United States in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration, and Professor of International Law, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.

Tuesday, April 23rd, 4.30 P. M.	Saturday, May 4th, 4.30 P. M.
Thursday, April 25th, 4.30 P. M.	Tuesday, May 7th, 4.30 P. M.
Tuesday, April 30th, 4.30 P. M.	Wednesday, May 8th, 4.30 P. M.
Wednesday, May 1st, 4.30 P. M.	Thursday, May 9th, 4.30 P. M.
Thursday, May 2nd, 4.30 P. M.	Friday, May 10th, 4.30 P. M.
Friday, May 3rd, 4.30 P. M.	Saturday, May 11th, 4.30 P. M.

These lectures will present in historical and analytical form the various projects which have been proposed to remove the causes of war, to maintain and to bring about international peace, thus making a logical commentary upon the Pontifical Brief and indicating the means by which its purposes may be realized.

